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What he has is what you see, and includes the resolve 
to get rid of things already absorbed.
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I am happy to be published again by punctum books in Eileen 
Joy’s Dead Letter Office series. Once again Vincent W. J. van 
Gerven Oei has designed a wonderful cover and expertly guided 
the book through production; I am very grateful to him for his 
warm attention. Lily Brewer copy edited lightly and admirably. 
The photographs in the book were taken by Hal Sedgwick; I 
thank him for providing them and allowing me to choose some 
to represent the exhibits of Eve’s work that accompanied her de-
livery of “Come as Your Are.” I am grateful for Hal’s support and 
enthusiasm for this project, and hope he will be happy with the 
results.
Melissa Solomon provided me with some copy texts for 
which I am grateful, as well as for the memories of Eve she 
shared with me. Jason Edwards kindly allowed me to see a copy 
of his forthcoming book on Eve’s art work. 
In the course of putting this volume together I have relied on 
Hal Rogers for unfailing support and advice. This project began 
in the fall 2019 semester when I sat in on a seminar on Eve’s 
work and legacy that Michael Moon conducted; I am grateful to 
that occasion and the conversations and thoughts it provoked. 
“After Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick” was prompted by the critics we 
read; in conversation with them, I turn to Eve’s work, its con-
tinuing provocations to thought. Michael read every page of this 
volume, in all its incarnations, always with loving interest and 
enthusiasm. Eve remarks in Tendencies on Michael’s extraor-
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dinary, infectious capacities for being interested. I have been 
sustained by that — and by his love — for more than thirty-five 






This book brings together two pieces of writing. In the first, 
“After Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick,” I continue (expand, reiterate) 
analysis of Eve’s work that motivated two earlier essays entitled 
“On the Eve of the Future” as well as “Eve’s Future Figures.” They 
posit a futurity also conveyed by “after”: those of us who write 
after Eve’s death see her as before us. In more than one sense we 
come after her. As Ramzi Fawaz writes in his introduction to 
Reading Sedgwick, Eve’s “work was always aspirational and an-
ticipatory.” It aims to “confer plenitude on … the field of critical 
thought” and offers “all of us … resources” to do so.1 In “After 
Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick,” I explore a number of recent responses 
to that call as I attend to how Eve’s late work extends the reach 
of queer theory — its “perverse, desiring energies that alone can 
move across ontological thresholds,” to borrow Eve’s description 
of the ambitions of The Warm Decembers.2 
“Come As You Are” is a talk Eve delivered at SUNY Stony 
Brook in fall 1999 and at the CUNY Graduate Center in spring 
2000. I might have included it in The Weather in Proust, opting 
1 Ramzi Fawaz, “‘An Open Mesh of Possibilities’: The Necessity of Eve Sedg-
wick in Dark Times,” in Reading Sedgwick, ed. Lauren Berlant (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 2019), 27.
2 Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, Fat Art, Thin Art (Durham: Duke University 
Press, 1994), 157.
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there to print a briefer, earlier version of it, “Reality and Reali-
zation,” and a later lecture, “Making Things, Practicing Empti-
ness,” that draws upon it: I relegated salient passages not found 
in those pieces to footnotes, and two poems of Eve’s quoted in 
it to my introduction. Scott Herring’s “Eve Sedgwick’s ‘Other 
Materials’” prompted me to make the entire lecture available. 
When I first contemplated writing more about Eve’s work, I had 
the feeling that I would want to put my essay beside “Come As 
You Are,” but it was only in writing “After Eve Kosofsky Sedg-
wick” that I came to understand that feeling; that realization gets 
worked out in the middle of my essay as I write about Scott’s — it 
offers a reading of “Come As You Are” avant la lettre, as it were, 
since all Scott had before him were its dispersed pieces in The 
Weather in Proust. 
Readers of this book may well want to start with Eve’s piece. 
However familiar some of it may be, it has its own logic, its own 
organization. Scott’s essay provides one way into it. In my essay, 
I focus on its questions about determination — overdetermina-
tion and underdetermination. Determination sounds closer to 
the former in this pair of supposed opposites except for the fact 
that “de” can’t help but suggest its own negation. Such double-
ness, its ontological purchase across boundaries, is my concern. 
It was a place Eve liked to be, as she told Stephen Barber and 
David Clark, “I’m always compelled by the place where a project 
of writing runs into things that I just can’t say. … That’s the un-
rationalizable place that seems worth being to me, often the only 
place that seems worth being.”3
In my essay, I refer to Eve as “Eve” more often than not, and have 
allowed first names in when commenting on the work of oth-
ers I know (or knew) personally. I do this not to prioritize that 
mode of relation; in fact, something else is central to my essay. 
Like Fawaz, who “never ‘met’ [Eve] except in and through her 
3 Stephen M. Barber and David L. Clark, “This Piercing Bouquet: An Inter-
view with Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick,” in Regarding Sedgwick, eds. Stephen M. 
Barber and David L. Clark (New York: Routledge, 2002), 246.
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textual performances” (27), I see the Eve(s) in her text as most 
“available” to all of us. As Fawaz suggests, her work is both ex-
traordinarily specific and yet generalizable, precise and deeply 
suggestive. As I will be arguing, it extends likeness that does 
not preclude difference but rather sustains identity as a site of 
multiple identifications, as Fawaz also affirms. The Eve anyone 
knew is only one site of the possibilities her work explores and 
opens (and to which she opened herself). As she writes at the 
end of “Queer and Now,” her writing “laminates” the possibility 
of making a “different thing” happen” through “the circuit of 
contagion, fun, voyeurism, envy, participation, and stimulation” 
in which occur the multiple, conflicting, processes of (dis)iden-
tification that “so many people need.”4





After Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick
Jonathan Goldberg
A year after Eve Sedgwick died, Michael Moon and I taught a 
graduate seminar on her work; “Reading Sedgwick” surveyed 
publications from the 1980s to the mid-’90s that came to be cat-
egorized as queer theory as well as some of Eve’s later work in 
affect theory, Buddhism, and textiles. Ten years after Eve’s death, 
for his final graduate seminar before retirement, Michael offered 
a course on her legacy. I attended many of the classes. Its fo-
cus was on later work and responses to it in the past ten years. 
“After Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick” was prompted by that reading. 
Coincidentally, “Eve’s Future Figures,” an essay I wrote soon af-
ter Eve’s death that includes reflections on our 2010 seminar, ap-
peared in Reading Sedgwick. Lauren Berlant opens the volume 
with “Reading Sedgwick, Then and Now.” I begin here with her 
timely reflections. My essay, although occasioned by the brief 
history I just offered, explores questions that have motivated my 
work since The Seeds of Things, published, “as it happens,” a few 
months after Eve’s death, although finished months before she 
died. Eve has been “behind” my work, at least since Sodometries, 
if not before; and always ahead. No one has mattered more to 
me in this respect; others, however different from me they are, 
feel the same way. That relationship also is a topic in what fol-
lows. 
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“Then and Now”
As Lauren Berlant notes, Reading Sedgwick was initiated by Mi-
chael O’Rourke soon after Eve died on April 12, 2009. As H.A. 
Sedgwick, Eve’s husband, Hal, details in his prefatory note to 
the collection, half of the essays in the volume originated in 
papers given at three sessions commemorating Eve at the 2010 
Modern Language Association convention. The divide between 
those writing “then” and the ones written “now,” joined in Ber-
lant’s collection and acknowledged in the title of her preface, 
is complicated from its opening sentence on: “This book calls 
up multiple pasts that are not past.”1 “Then,” in this formula-
tion, remains “now,” as it still is when the preface concludes by 
characterizing “now” as an “iteration of the reactionary turn” of 
the “then,” the time when Eve first intervened: that reiteration 
“makes the Eve who diagnosed the ‘then’ even more newly nec-
essary in the emerging and solidifying ‘now’” (4). These uses of 
“now” and “then” recall in advance the subtitle of Fawaz’s intro-
duction, “The Necessity of Eve Sedgwick in Dark Times.” “Now” 
and “then,” destabilized by scare quotes, join in a reiteration that 
remains bound to dark times. 
Nonetheless, it can seem as if the writing of the Eve who 
passed remains in the past, especially when it is described as 
“occasional” and “situational.” Likewise, the essays written now 
seem timebound when they are said to show “the presence of 
their situatedness” through their “reenactment … in or around 
Eve” (1). Parsing the temporal relation between the situational 
and the reiterated is difficult, although tilted in one direction 
when Eve’s formative queer theory is located in the Reagan 
years, while her later work in reparation, affect theory, and 
“Buddhist metempsychoses” (4) is dated to the heady, delusion-
al Obama era. (In fact, most of Eve’s work dates from the Bush 
and Clinton years.) “Now” and “Then” offer “situational writing 
from specific historical moments” (1). “Those of us for whom 
1 Lauren Berlant, “Reading Sedgwick, Then and Now,” in Reading Sedgwick, 
ed. Lauren Berlant (Durham: Duke University Press, 2019), 1. 
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Eve was a living presence at very specific historic conjunctures” 
are divided from the current “generation of scholars who can 
assume queerness.” (2). For “us who were Eve’s contemporaries, 
the questions are different”: how to continue our attachment to 
her is one; “how do we continue the project of coming to terms 
with what we can’t specifically have asked for” (2) another.
These questions of continuity question the limits of the 
specificity of a life — of a then and now — beside something that 
survives, persists, desired and yet unexpected; that something, 
I would venture, also may define a life — a then or a now — and, 
so doing, put pressure on those temporal markers the way Ber-
lant does at the beginning and end of her preface. What persists 
is further remarked when she invokes the multiple “modes” of 
Eve’s “being herself for her friends, students, colleagues, and for 
criticism” (1). The last of these involves her many styles of writ-
ing. If the essays gathered in Reading Sedgwick share “a strong 
mimetic drive to be with Eve by being like Eve” (1–2), that like-
ness cannot be reduced to a singularity. And when the essays are 
further described as resulting from “individual decisions about 
retaining and erasing traces of their origins” (1), retention and 
erasure arguably surpass individual decisions. The persistence 
of reiteration across now and then also points this way, prompt-
ing the reiterative, retrospective effect of the volume that Berlant 
aptly terms “queer respect” (1). 
How definitive is the distinction between those whose rela-
tion to Eve is “an attachment known only through her writing” 
from those of “us for whom Eve was a living presence” (2)? I cer-
tainly belong in that latter group: Eve and I were friends for the 
last twenty years of her life, from soon after she joined the Duke 
English Department, when Michael Moon, who had taken a po-
sition there a year or two before, moved into her house. I lived 
with them on Montgomery Street weekends, summers, on sab-
baticals. I went with Eve to her doctor when she got her initial 
cancer diagnosis; I cooked dinner for her during her subsequent 
round of chemo. With Michael and Hal, I sat at her bedside dur-
ing her last days. She entrusted her late writing to me to edit and 
publish.
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Certainly, I knew and loved and admired Eve. Lauren asks, 
for those of us who knew her, “what it meant, and still means to 
be writing with Eve not just on, but in, our minds” (2). It makes 
a difference but not a categorical one since, as she also says, 
the modes of writing in which Eve offered herself through the 
powerful heuristic of the “I” inscribes a position any of us can 
variously inhabit. To put this another way, I would recall what I 
wrote in “On the Eve of the Future,” and quote in “Eve’s Future 
Figures,” about what Eve meant by the reality that survives one’s 
own death or the painful loss of someone deeply loved: “Eve 
herself was irreplaceable, but also not singular. As she insists in 
“The Weather in Proust,” one meaning of supra-individuality is 
that one is connected and constituted beyond oneself, connect-
ed thereby to versions of oneself that succeed oneself … the life 
beyond life that inheres in relation that exceeds and constitutes 
the individual.”2 Writing, one of the places where that life con-
tinues to exist, continues beyond our own lives.
*
In the pages that follow I revisit Eve in the spirit that Philomina 
Tsoukala affirms. Writing about the visceral effect of reading a 
writer known only through her writing, Tsoukala found that 
Eve “seemed to be ages ahead of me.”3 This is not a chrono-
logical reckoning: Eve knows her better than Tsoukala knows 
herself. This allows her, in writing, to be where Eve is, indeed 
to be vicariously, physically, sexually, psychologically, with her. 
Many readers have had versions of this feeling on first reading 
Eve. Lauren attests to it in “Two Girls, Fat and Thin” when she 
records her initial excitement on encountering Eve’s writing, 
its espousal of attachments capable of “unsurpassable conse-
quence,” “an attitude toward what thinking (as écriture) can do”; 
2 Jonathan Goldberg, “On the Eve of the Future,” PMLA 125, no. 2 (March 
2010): 376.
3 Philomina Tsoukala, “Reading ‘A Poem is Being Written’,” Harvard Journal 
of Law & Gender 33, no. 1 (Winter 2010): 343.
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“Attachments are made … by an intelligence after which we are 
always running.”4 In following after Eve, she is at once past and 
yet before us. We come running after.
*
Although I knew Eve well for many years, in person and on 
the page, my first actual meeting with her, at English Institute in 
1984 I believe, was not very auspicious. Between Men was forth-
coming, and I wanted to talk about it. Eve wanted only to talk 
about getting back to The Warm Decembers. We got nowhere. 
I read Between Men and published a review of the chapter on 
Shakespeare’s sonnets, alongside some other work on sexuality 
in the early modern period, in GSN, the gay studies newsletter 
edited by Michael Lynch that was the forerunner of GLQ. While 
I appreciated Eve’s forthright acknowledgment of male-male 
erotics — and female sexuality, too, in Shakespeare’s sonnets — I 
worried about her recourse to “heterosexuality” as the only term 
to describe sexuality in a culture that didn’t have “homosexual-
ity” in its lexicon. A few years ago, at a conference occasioned 
by the thirtieth anniversary of the publication of Between Men, 
I gave a paper entitled “Misgivings” in which I rehearsed my 
early response. I did it in part to make reparations (I came to 
see how powerful Eve’s argument was and that I had misread it 
initially), but mostly because it suggested something more im-
portant: Eve’s writing is powerfully present precisely because it 
is always ahead of us; ahead of her too. Having Eve in mind does 
not happen in the same way to all of us, or in the same way for 
any one of us whenever we encounter her texts. Lauren knows 
this too. Soon after Eve’s death, in “Eve Sedgwick, Once More,” 
she describes her first encounter with Eve’s writing this way: 
“it had made me gasp, resist, have reveries, think twice, think 
4 Lauren Berlant, “Two Girls, Fat and Thin,” in Regarding Sedgwick: Essays 
on Queer Culture and Critical Theory, eds. Stephen M. Barber and David L. 
Clark (New York: Routledge, 2002), 71, 73, 74.
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bigger, and become different.”5 Judith Butler reports something 
akin in “Capacity,” about reading and rereading Between Men: 
“each time I was being asked to think differently than I usually 
do.”6 Eve is always before us, the locus of misgivings that may be 
missed opportunities to think again or may afford us — whoever 
we are at whatever moment of reading — possibilities we didn’t 
know we could grasp. They resonate beyond the present, but 
still in a present that will inevitably not include us as one kind 
of “living presence.” Such an absence does not deny, as Berlant 
intimates, how she still lives.
After
In “Bringing Out D.A. Miller,” on Miller’s stance in Bringing Out 
Roland Barthes, Barbara Johnson distinguishes between “out-
ing” and “bringing out.” Questions of temporality are involved. 
In each of its instances, outing means to be a once-for-all af-
fair marked by before/after parameters, a decisive conversion. 
“Bringing out,” whose stylistic import Johnson stresses, entails 
revelations that are partial, piecemeal, matters of emphasis or 
occlusion — what is shown, brought out, necessarily leaves oth-
er things in the shadows, unsaid, concealed from view. Revela-
tion is a process; it requires time to take place; it does not neces-
sarily end. Johnson connects it to the Delphic command “know 
thyself.” That too is not a once-for-all event. “The Delphic oracle 
doesn’t ask, doesn’t tell, and doesn’t pursue,” she wittily com-
ments, drawing on the language around gays in the us military 
that leaves unsaid what remains to be (un)said.7
“Bringing out” always comes after. Might that temporality 
reflect “the body’s own denial of the category of identity” (7), 
5 Lauren Berlant, “Eve Sedgwick, Once More,” Critical Inquiry 35, no. 4 
(Summer 2009): 1089.
6 Judith Butler, “Capacity,” in Regarding Sedgwick: Essays on Queer Culture 
and Critical Theory, eds. Stephen M. Barber and David L. Clark (New 
York: Routledge, 2002), 109. 
7 Barbara Johnson, “Bringing Out D.A. Miller,” Narrative 10, no. 1 (January 
2002): 5. 
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Johnson wonders (perhaps in the vein of Maurice Merleau-Pon-
ty in “Indirect Language and the Voices of Silence”). What if the 
before and after of outing were not the story line that accom-
panies identity? Or, to ask the question differently, what if that 
story was tied to a real that co-exists with and yet lies to the side 
of the reality conferred and designated by distinctions such as 
those that link “before” to “after”? To ask this is to glimpse — to 
posit — a reality that is both before and after. That is the tem-
poral framework in which I would situate — bring out — axiom 
one in Epistemology of the Closet: “People are different from each 
other.”8 Its bottom line of singularity is announced through the 
word “different.” Difference is not an identity. Indeed, it is close 
to its opposite (although it might not be non-identity either). 
Axiom one might well restate the injunction enjoined by the 
Delphic Oracle. It is, at any rate, an oracular utterance. “Dif-
ferent” could be the adjective to describe the verbal force that 
Johnson explores as “bringing out,” an utterance whose impera-
tive — to act — is at the same time recursive. It intimates a turn-
ing rather than a definitive movement from one thing or state 
to another, from one time to another. These questions about 
identity — outed or brought out, lead Johnson, Miller, and me 
as well, to ask how an author is in her text. Johnson answers by 
noting that “it is impossible to know whether one is bringing 
out the person or the writings. And that is what Barthes means 
by ‘the death of the author’” (8).
*
Johnson’s essay is not about Sedgwick. Nonetheless her parsing 
of Miller’s “bringing out” seems to me suggestive for reading 
Eve. Writing about the opening sentence of Bringing Out Roland 
Barthes Johnson notices how Miller makes “us believe in the re-
ality of the voice of the living person” (8). Eve does that par-
ticularly stunningly at the close of “White Glasses,” a eulogy for 
8 Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, Epistemology of the Closet (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1990), 22.
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Michael Lynch that Eve was able to deliver while he still lived. 
Exploring their identifications, the essay involves the crossing of 
life and death: Eve’s unanticipated cancer diagnosis brings with 
it another suspended death sentence. Writing takes place in this 
suspension, the uncanny temporality of the after, the time that 
remains.
*
Hi Michael! I know I probably got almost everything wrong 
but I hope you didn’t just hate this. See you in a couple of 
weeks. (Tendencies, 266) 
“Reality and Realization”
First published in The Weather in Proust, “Reality and Real-
ization” was delivered at the 1998 convention of the Modern 
Language Association. Eve opens by glancing at her ambition 
to explore the conjunction she calls “Critical Theory, Buddhist 
Practice,” seemingly as an academic project — an anthology 
or a conference are mentioned as two possible forms it might 
take. It could be that, but Eve’s gloss on the topic by way of its 
foundation in “shared nondualistic understandings of more or 
other than a series of propositional readings” suggests some-
thing else, something “more or other,” a “sharing” of what they 
have in common that the terms “Critical” and “Buddhist” do 
not themselves convey since they do not align along any axis 
of definitional similarity (“Theory” and “Practice” usually are 
treated as opposites).9 Possibilities are furthered when Eve plu-
ralizes “understandings” of “Theory,” as “deconstruction or, say, 
systems theory” (207). She illuminates the nondualism of these 
gestures later in the essay when she quotes Dudjom Rinpoche’s 
description of the nature of mind: “It has never been liberated / 
9 Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, The Weather in Proust (Durham: Duke University 
Press, 2011), 207. 
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It has never been deluded / It has never existed / It has never 
been nonexistent” (209). 
Like Barbara Johnson’s “bringing out” project, Eve’s seeks 
to supplement propositional thinking that aims at the defini-
tive — at identity — with a capacity of identification in which 
“more” or “other” are not incompatible (they are coupled with 
an “or” that could as easily be an “and”). The form of knowing 
that they support is “more an issue of practice … than of episte-
mology” (207), less something to know than a way of knowing, 
doing, and being.
Conceptual and historical parameters of Eve’s academic proj-
ect are sketched in the second paragraph of “Reality and Real-
ization,” which glances at moments when Buddhism and west-
ern thought came together in a number of thinkers, unnamed, 
who might “reflect a zeitgeist or two (or twenty)” (206). “Stories 
that await telling” remain untold, however, except in gestures 
to names of places and groups. (Fuller consideration of these 
topics is given in “Pedagogy of Buddhism” in Touching Feeling.) 
The paragraph that follows moves on to “another set of stories,” 
those that ally theory and Buddhism. But rather than pursue 
these agendas, or to do so otherwise, in lieu of them, Eve of-
fers “a slight but true story” (207) about her own preparation 
for foreign travel and her experiences in Asia. She reads guide-
books to know what to expect and how to behave. This travel is 
literal, yet it bears upon her project and its reach; Eve had called 
the conjunction of theory and practice, criticism and Buddhism 
“haimish to anyone whose mother’s milk has been deconstruc-
tion or, say, systems theory” (207). In these conjunctions, the 
at-home and the exotic come together, embodied in a digestive 
process.
The “slight” story on offer bears the weight of demonstrat-
ing “the troubled mismatch between knowledge and realization” 
that constitutes one of “the distinctive bonds” that tie togeth-
er “the shared nondualistic understandings” of critical theory 
and Buddhist thought (207). It hinges on the ubiquity of gift 
exchange in Asia. Eve couches the lesson taught in all the guide-
books as a maternal dictum: “Remember? We talked about this 
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at home. Now, when you hand over this present, what do you 
do?” (208) The answer is, you use both hands. As Eve tells the 
story, it appears that is exactly what she forgot to do, or forgot 
the dictum in doing. Knowing and realizing meet there. And 
why not? The story is about exchange, this for that, this or that, 
making equivalent the non-equivalent, something suggested 
as well by the variousness of the gifts Eve bears, theory books, 
maple syrup, baby gifts. Eve’s destination is at once heimlich and 
unheimlich; to Asia, but to her brother’s home and his newborn 
son (the baby’s mother Songmin is named, but not identified 
as David Kosofsky’s wife). The story seems to show that Eve 
failed to realize what she knew — use two hands — but that an 
exchange was nonetheless accomplished, took place even if the 
propositional injunction was not followed or not kept in mind. 
Realization has “nothing necessarily transcendent about” it af-
ter all (209); it lies in the doing. Exchange, anthropologists like 
Claude Lévi-Strauss and Marcel Mauss before him taught us, is 
the basis of culture: women, goods, words, are their medium. 
They accomplish their work through transportation, transposi-
tion, displacement and alienation. While there is nothing nec-
essarily transcendent in these material movements, the doing 
involves the displacement inherent in tying the concept of the 
gift, definitionally a giving without exchange, to a relationship 
of exchange, singlehandedness to two-handedness, identity to 
identification.
The title “Reality and Realization” couples two terms that 
could appear to name the same thing twice or to name two 
things that seem almost impossible to distinguish and which 
nonetheless are as distinct as the two words are. What these 
words share, Eve claims, is an “orthogonal” relationship to prop-
ositional truth (208) — the numerous true statements one might 
make about any situation will never coincide with the reality of 
any moment. The temporality of that moment is not easily de-
scribed. Realization lags behind knowledge “by months or eons” 
(209), a timespan akin to the zeitgeist or two or twenty of east-
west encounters. In the gap between propositional knowledge 
and its realization, practice endlessly recurs. Eve illuminates it 
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through the concept of the bardo, an in-between state in which 
one is suspended, in dreams, in meditation, in death. The latter 
is a privileged state called the bardo of Dharmata, the bardo of 
reality. It begins immediately after death. Any bardo is meant 
to open the eyes of practitioners to the realization that any mo-
ment is one of in-between suspension. For Eve, that realiza-
tion came around death, as it did for Johnson by way of Roland 
Barthes on the death of the author. It was “learning that a cancer 
I had thought was in remission had in fact become incurable” 
that brought home “the considerable distance between knowing 
that one will die and realizing it” (210). To which one must add, 
as Eve does, the fact that such a realization is “coupled with the 
seemingly absolute inaccessibility of our own death to our liv-
ing consciousness” (210). The coupling of reality and realization 
occurs in a suspension and gap that never is overcome until it is 
realized in a place or time inaccessible to “living consciousness”: 
this is where our (mortal) being coincides with Being, with what 
is. As Sedgwick repeatedly suggests, this is where theory, with 
its propositional truth claims, lags behind Buddhist practices.
Beside any cause-effect, before-after propositional logic, 
such practices follow the maternal injunction that one is bound 
to remember to forget. Never achieving the goal of mastery, the 
finality of knowing, these practices of mindfulness take place in 
a now that is a between or a beside. Their “real, obscure tempo-
rality” (210) is an after that looks ahead at what is before, onto-
logically an unheimlich heimat, an “itself ” that also is “ourselves 
and not other than ourselves” (211).
*
“I know I probably got almost everything wrong,” Eve says to 
Michael Lynch, that is to say, I know what the Delphic oracle 
was urging on me, a practice of knowing coincident with not 
knowing. So “I” can be wrong about almost everything but not 
about the possibility that Eve’s “I” assays when she sends her 
greeting across what propositional thinking supposes to be the 
uncrossable boundary between life and death.
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“Twisted Temporalities,” “Queer Temporality”
These two phrases appear in the titles of two versions of Jane 
Gallop’s 2011 essay on Eve, “Sedgwick’s Twisted Temporalities,” 
from which I will be quoting, and “The Queer Temporality of 
Writing,” in which she extends her reading of Eve to the other 
authors she considers in The Deaths of the Author. Gallop fetches 
the latter phrase from Barber and Clark’s introduction to Re-
garding Sedgwick. The “queer temporality” she has in mind, as 
she notes there, and again in “Early and Earlier Sedgwick,” her 
contribution to Reading Sedgwick, is borrowed from Barber and 
Clark. In that later piece, she takes stock of Eve’s authorial re-
visitations in prefaces to the 1992 reissue of Between Men and 
the republication of The Coherence of Gothic Fiction in 1986. 
Gallop registers shock at the self-divisions that Eve performs in 
these pieces of writing, the author doubled by death and desire, 
split between first and third persons. Eve’s return to earlier Eves 
frames Gallop’s review of her own earlier essay, my focus here. 
In that piece, “White Glasses,” along with Eve’s “Memorial for 
Craig Owens,” are read closely. Both appear in Tendencies, and 
her readings grapple to define the queer moment that volume 
announces.
To do that, Gallop embraces Barber and Clark’s claim that a 
“specifically queer temporality” in Tendencies jostles “a recog-
nizable temporal frame, … another conception and unfolding 
of temporality” (2). In a footnote at the end of her essay, she of-
fers a gloss by quoting “White Glasses,” where Eve writes, “what 
is at work here … falls … across the ontological crack between 
the living and the dead.”10 That between could be teased perhaps 
from the title of the first essay in Tendencies, “Queer and Now.” 
It couples “queer” to a temporal marker by way of the little word 
“and” (to recall Wagner’s Isolde on the “und” that joins her to 
Tristan). “Something about queer is inextinguishable” is Eve’s 
10 Jane Gallop, “Sedgwick’s Twisted Temporalities,” in Queer Times, Queer 
Becomings, eds. E.L. McCallum and Mikko Tukhanen (Albany: suny Press, 
2011), 73n25.
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numinous gloss on the “now” of queer (Tendencies xii), as she 
traces the etymological roots of the word, “twist” among them. 
Gallop chooses that word to focus queer temporality in relation 
to the writing that survives the death of the author. Eve empha-
sizes its transitivity, its mobile motion across.
The queer twist on temporality in Gallop’s essay becomes an 
ironic twist: “the slow organic temporality” (57) of expectation 
suffers the sudden surprise of its bafflement by death. The end 
of life ends the writing process; before and after are in a rela-
tion of estrangement and distortion. These ironic twists are di-
rected against the writer’s attempt at mastery of the situation. 
The writer is both Eve and Jane Gallop herself: at the very mo-
ment Gallop finds Sedgwick having trouble writing she adds a 
footnote to confess her own difficulty finishing her essay. Both 
writers overcome their difficulty, however, Eve in the completed 
essay, “Tales of the Avunculate,” which takes up a prompt from 
Craig Owens, as well as in the uncanny liveness of her address 
to Michael Lynch in “White Glasses.” Picking up on Eve’s claim 
in the foreword to Tendencies that “queer” is a “continuing mo-
ment,” Gallop links the present tense utterance of Eve to Mi-
chael Lynch as one that stands outside temporality in its refusal 
of the rhythm of expectation and fulfilment whose disruptions 
her readings chart. By staying behind, it becomes anachronis-
tic. Lynch gets to hear his obituary; he is “still alive and already 
dead,” she writes, “a very unsettling moment … . out of and in 
time” (70). In a final ironic twist, the framework of before and 
after interrupted by the unbridgeable gap between life and death 
is joined in an “and.”
It always is “and” in Sedgwick’s writing. Gallop’s gap — and 
the “or” it supposes — is only part of the story. Following Barber 
and Clark who find the celebration of queer at the opening of 
Tendencies “hedged,” Gallop locates Eve’s hesitation to celebrate 
the visible arrival of the queer moment as the temporal distor-
tion AIDS introduced into the queer parade, at once a slowing 
down of life to good days and bad ones, and a speeding up to a 
precipitous end. Gallop extends this distortion to the grammar 
of Eve’s sentence, relocating a parenthesis she thinks starts in 
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the wrong place and includes issues that don’t belong together. 
“The long parenthesis distorts the text. AIDS and death are part 
of that distortion,” she writes (52). The issues in the parenthesis 
are indeed far from univocal; they include signs of gay accep-
tance — by the incoming president (Clinton), in the strong pres-
ence of people of color for the first time in the annual gay march; 
of stigma and prejudice against people with AIDS; of misguided 
straight and gay politics — the embrace of bisexuality and of 
military service. That is their point: all these “other moments” 
than the queer moment nonetheless coincide in it. Queer time 
is a matter of either/or and of both/and.
Gallop worries the temporal relationship of Tendencies and 
Epistemology of the Closet, emphasizing the distance between 
them, claiming that Eve’s stress on their proximity “would mini-
mize almost out of existence” (48) the three years that separate 
the two books. Death marks this difference. Similarly, she em-
phasizes how the death of Craig Owens robbed Eve of any mo-
tive to finish writing her essay. “Suddenly I couldn’t do that,” Eve 
writes (105–6); “Sedgwick is having a hard time writing,” “Sedg-
wick underscores how difficult writing was,” “Sedgwick is hav-
ing a very hard time writing,” she reiterates (57). “As it turns out, 
however, the memorial’s sense of impossibility is in fact only 
temporary,” Gallop admits a couple of pages later (59), going on 
to glance at “Tales of the Avunculate,” which she first summa-
rizes accurately enough as involving “the queer in the family,” 
but then, just as quickly, moves to its ironic twist, declaring the 
conclusion of that essay a surprise and abruption in its “militant 
rejection of the family” (60).
This moment of surprise could be put beside an earlier one 
that Gallop notices when she compares “a feature of queer 
possibility” that Eve explores in Proust (in “Paranoid and Re-
parative Reading”) to the foreshortening of AIDS: “first she es-
tablishes deroutinized temporality as an attractive, even joyful 
possession, before she links it to brutality and death,” she writes 
(51). The two are not quite so disjunct; the “temporal disorien-
tation,” Sedgwick writes, of this “revelatory space would have 
been impossible in a heterosexual père de famille, in one who 
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had meanwhile been embodying, in the form of inexorably ‘pro-
gressing’ identities and roles, the regular arrival of children and 
grandchildren.”11 The assault on the family, its opacity about the 
queer in the family, points to the “something” in queer that re-
mains inextinguishable: a revelatory space of realization of sur-
vival despite the power of ignorance, denial, exclusion, and stig-
ma. Its coincidence of temporalities is akin to the coincidence 
of minoritizing and universalizing impulses in the formation of 
sexual identities that enable “relational and strange” movements 
across boundaries, even including the ontological divide of life 
and death.
For another boundary crossed in Eve, consider Gallop’s exci-
sion of Audre Lorde’s name from her citation and close reading 
of the parenthesis at the opening of Tendencies (52) in which Eve 
names together the AIDS deaths of Tom Yingling and Melvin 
Dixon and Lorde’s from cancer. In footnote 20, close to the end 
of “Twisted Temporalities,” Gallop acknowledges her omission, 
claiming that her heightening of the ironic twist follows Eve 
since she does not immediately reveal her cancer diagnosis in 
“White Glasses.” AIDS and cancer, however, are coincident from 
the start of Tendencies, part of Eve’s pursuit of sameness and dif-
ference across gender and race, among other categories. 
Although the death of the author and the liveness of writing 
are her ultimate concerns, Gallop’s essay on Eve’s temporalities 
narrows its focus to writing in its most literal sense. Her analy-
sis of the “Memorial for Craig Owens” follows from Eve’s first 
meeting him in print (in an essay in which he singled her out 
from other feminists for her anti-homophobic argument con-
necting women and gay men) to his death while Eve was writing 
“Tales of the Avunculate.” “Relation” is a key term in the memo-
rial. It involves “part-objects,” writing serving as a main example 
of the materials of a strange and strangely familiar relationship. 
11 Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, “Paranoid Reading and Reparative Reading; or, 
You’re So Paranoid, You Probably Think This Introduction Is About You,” 
in Novel Gazing: Queer Readings in Fiction (Durham: Duke University 
Press, 1997), 26.
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Gallop attaches to it a Freudian frame of perversity. That might 
be part of the story; Eve’s invocation of the term certainly is in-
debted to Melanie Klein and D.W. Winnicott’s development of 
object relations. Eve’s “motive,” she writes in the memorial, goes 
“very deep” and seems immemorial (104). Begun in writing, it 
continued when she and Craig Owens met: “seeing him felt like 
keeping an assignation we’d always had, and it felt that way to 
me each of the few times we got to see each other” (104). “Al-
ways” disrupts the sequence.
What continues is not something easily parsed. Eve makes no 
claim to know what Craig Owens really was “like,” whether her 
relation to him was one that others who knew him would have 
recognized, or whether he would have articulated their relation 
in the same way. Not knowing such things, a point she empha-
sizes, does not preclude knowing that somehow what they ex-
changed was something that neither of them “had a right to be 
surprised” by (104). So, to the surprise of the interruption of 
death add a matching non-surprise of a non-equivalent equiv-
alence between things and persons unlike yet like each other. 
From the elements of his “differential social identity,” Owens of-
fered Eve a place for her “identificatory life” answered by the 
“parts” of her that “might be … inside Craig” (105), “a durable 
motive that went very deep” in both directions. “I can’t imagine 
yet what will happen to the motive Craig provided in me,” she 
writes; “Craig’s vitality” is that motive, the motor force that he 
“animated with both his presences and absences,” “this strange, 
utterly discontinuous, projective space of desire euphemisti-
cally named friendship, love at a distance, or even just reading 
and writing” (105). Crucial to this discontinuity and difference 
is precisely its power to continue beyond the person even as it 
contributes to “all the different surfaces that make a self for most 
of us” (104). 
This conjunction defines “what falling in love means” to Eve, 
she writes in A Dialogue on Love: “It’s a matter of suddenly, glob-
ally, ‘knowing’ that another person represents your only access 
to some vitally,
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and that if you lose the thread of intimacy, both you and your 
whole world might subsist forever in some desert-like state of 
ontological impoverishment.”12 “Knowing” is in scare quotes 
here because what Eve describes is a realization that is self-con-
stitutive yet made in relation to another, or to an otherness in 
the beloved whose vitality, whose life, shared, provides the ac-
cess point for truths and perceptions that are likewise transper-
sonal and impersonal, intimate and radiant. The ontological 
richness of this relationship cannot be divorced from its being 
merely a thread in some weaving that is not one’s own and yet 
constitutes one’s self in a world. 
In formulations like these, object relations inhere not only as 
objects, but in objects, including the ones we are in relation to 
what is strange, not us and yet us. It might be found in “a couple 
of cryptic paragraphs” we try to decipher (Tendencies 105). “The 
verbal aura that attached to this cherished adhesion,” Eve writes, 
using Whitman’s preferred term for relation, “hovered around 
the magical words, enigmatic, magnetic” (106). She worries at 
the end of her obituary that what will now “unfold and unfold” 
in her will be the loss of this cherished “subject and object.” Al-
though she genuinely does not know what will come of loss, 
what happens is inherent in strange relations that exceed what 
an “I” might know, a knowledge not entirely one’s own to know 
even as it inhabits one’s writing and being, a relationship to oth-
ers and past them too: “Now the sense of gratitude and luck, 
which painfully can’t diminish, are fermenting around I can’t tell 
what point of adhesion — since I feel I genuinely don’t know if 
this inexorable disclosure now can unfold anything but, repeat-
edly, the loss of its subject and object” (106). The gratitude, and 
the motive it carries are equally inexorable: On the one hand, 
12 Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, A Dialogue on Love (Boston: Beacon Press, 1999), 
168.
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nothing lasts forever; on the other, something goes on. Writing 
is one name for that something inextinguishable. “The eventual 
unfolding of that enclosure, already internal, was part of what, I 
always thought, was going to constitute me: for better and may-
be also worse, for comfort and conceivably danger” (106).
The memorial thus ends with something still fermenting. 
So, too, the uncanny voice at the end of “White Glasses” per-
sists beyond the bounds of life and death. Gallop acknowledges 
this glancing at the dedication page of Tendencies, three photos 
of Eve and Michael at the grave of Emily Dickinson, and the 
words, “In memory of Michael Lynch, and with love to him.” 
“I thought I would have to — I thought I could — address this 
to you instead of Michael,” Eve addresses the audience of pre-
sumed mourners, “and now (yikes) I can do both” (256). In the 
dedication she does both too, sending her love to dead Michael 
Lynch. This queer motion (motive) athwart moves across the 
divide: “Now, shock and mourning gaze in both directions 
through the obituary frame, and much more than shock and 
mourning, it is exciting that Michael is alive and full of beans 
today, sick as he is; I think it is exciting for both of us that I am; 
and in many ways it is full of stimulation and interest, even, to 
be ill and writing” (256). 
“The I who does both is also a different one with new fears 
and temporalities” (256). The name for that new time at the 
conclusion of “White Glasses” is “this long moment,” and Eve 
longs “to know more and more” about it (266). The way through 
and across it is captured in a line from the poem by Ariwara no 
Narihara that Eve stenciled on to her fabric art: “I have always 
known that I would take this path, but yesterday I did not know 
it would be today” (Weather in Proust 111). Commenting on it, 
Eve remarks her fondness for weaving herself into an “I” that is 
not herself, one, moreover, on the point of unraveling. That point 
is the nexus of her identifications across, for her “real dread” is 
not of dying before her time, “but about losing the people who 
make … [her] want to live” (Tendencies 264). In the obituary 
relation, “anyone, living or dead, may occupy the position of the 
speaker, the spoken to, the spoken about” (264). These crossings 
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at “the ontological crack between the living and the dead” move 
along the axis of “an identification that falls across gender … 
sexualities … ‘perversions’” (257).
If so-called “organic” temporality supposes that one thing 
follows another, it’s worth noticing how, in “White Glasses,” 
that’s not how the writing proceeds, and not just in the volte-
faces on which Gallop fastens. Eve begins with her first meet-
ing with Michael Lynch three times in topic sentences that vary 
slightly, same and different at once: “The first time I met Mi-
chael Lynch …,” “When I first met Michael Lynch …,” “The day 
I first met Michael Lynch” (252–53). These are, perhaps, tellings 
of the same encounter, involving the same persons, the “I” and 
“Michael Lynch”; Eve first focuses on his white glasses, her be-
lief that within a year every gay man will be sporting them; she 
resolves: “I want to be first.” She wants to be first, before all the 
other gay men, but after Michael Lynch. The object that would 
retrospectively put her in his position is precisely that, an object. 
White glasses matter here as a prosthetic non-organic extension 
that prolongs relation beyond any recognizable likeness to make 
them “like.”
The second “first” situates Michael differently, not through 
his glasses but in terms of his contributions to gay studies and 
gay activism, a part he plays and to which he attracts and attach-
es others. It places him in a then tiny field of academia: everyone 
who fits the bill gathers in a coffee shop at the 1986 MLA conven-
tion. Finally, another “first”: Michael Lynch’s ex, Bill Lewis, has 
just been diagnosed with AIDS: “the Michael I met and fell in 
love with, was to some degree I could never estimate, a Michael 
made different on the same day by the suddenly more graphic 
proximity of intimate loss” (253). Its effect? It enhanced “Mi-
chael’s availability to be identified with and loved.” By becoming 
other than himself, Michael has begun to know and to arrive at 
that boundary to which Eve was drawn in an identification that 
began in an object (white glasses). It issues immediately in this 
statement of identity/identification: “the I who met Michael and 
fell in love with his white glasses … was nobody simpler than 
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the handsome and complicated poet and scholar I met in him” 
(253).
For an image to accompany this, I, like Jane Gallop, turn 
to the dedication page of Tendencies, the photo collage of Eve 
and Michael at the tomb of Emily Dickinson that Jason Ed-
wards informs us was titled “Eternity’s White Flag.” “Sedgwick 
and Lynch tenderly interlocked over Dickinson’s grave,” Jason 
writes.13 Eve’s identification as a gay man passed through her and 
Michael’s differentially shared lesbian identification with Dick-
inson (and with Willa Cather), and through the blanket from 
the lesbian aunt who raised him that Michael gave Eve after her 
cancer diagnosis. These fostered a likeness that had nothing to 
do with how they looked or how white glasses looked on them 
(Eve provides an exacting discussion of the whiteness of the 
white glasses in relation to race and gender), nor even how they 
saw through the funereal frame. White is attached to death and 
blankness, to the “nobody” simpler and more complicated than 
one finds in a “fiercely transitive” relation “that might cross bar-
riers” (Tendencies 253). Hence Eve’s attachment to “the unbear-
ably double-edged imperative” of the reiterated “Out, out” (261):
She should have died hereafter:
There would have been a time for such a word, — 
To-morrow, and to-morrow, and to-morrow,
Creeps in this petty pace from day to day,
To the last syllable of recorded time;
And all our yesterdays have lighted fools
The way to dusty death. Out, out, brief candle!
Life’s but a walking shadow; a poor player,
That struts and frets his hour upon the stage,
And then is heard no more: it is a tale
Told by an idiot, full of sound and fury,
Signifying nothing.
(Macbeth 5.5.17–28)
13 Jason Edwards, Bathroom Songs: Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick as a Poet (Earth: 
punctum books, 2017), 73–74.
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Eve reads the inevitable snuffing of the flame of individual life 
that is ours alongside the “performative injunction” of coming-
out, bringing out, being out, “the imperative of visibility, defi-
ance, solidarity, and self-assertion” (261). These are so little op-
posites that “Out, out” could as soon mean “Include, include.” 
Michael’s “availability to identification” is something that Eve 
claims for herself: “It’s as though there were transformative po-
litical work to be done just by being available to be identified 
with in the very grain of one’s illness (which is to say, the grain 
of one’s own intellectual, emotional, bodily self as refracted 
through illness and as resistant to it) — being available for iden-
tification to friends, but as well to people who don’t love one; 
even to people who may not like one at all nor wish one well” 
(261). “I have never felt less stability in my gender, age, and racial 
identities, nor, anxious and full of the shards of dread, shame, 
and mourning as this process is, have I ever felt more of a mind 
to explore and exploit every possibility” (264).The adventure of 
life/death is not other than the dream of “dolce far niente” she 
hopes for when Michael visits (259), doing and being nothing 
and nobody, signifying nothing.
“Eve Sedgwick’s ‘Other Materials’”
My heading is the title of an essay by Scott Herring that has 
galvanized this book project; more immediately, it furthers my 
consideration of materiality in Eve’s thought. Herring borrows 
from a course title of Eve’s, “How To Do Things with Words 
and Other Materials.” Obliquely, but finally, and centrally, his 
essay embraces the conjunction of words with other materials 
that Eve declared a foregone conclusion in her own late fab-
ric art (Weather in Proust 106). Most of his essay richly mines 
Eve’s writing, early and late, for material conjunctions, as, for 
example, in a passage he quotes from Dialogue of Love: “THE 
BUDDHIST STUFF, MANIA FOR MAKING UNSPEAKING OBJECTS” 
(Dialogue 107). As “stuff,” Buddhist thought provides a material 
correlate for the “unspeaking objects” Eve made. In them, her 
own personhood and agency faced limits she felt in the push 
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back of her materials, inorganic matter with a mind of its own, 
so to speak, objects insisting on being. Anal matter, Herring ar-
gues, is a prime referent for the “other materials” that thread 
their way through Eve’s oeuvre. Following it, he also is led to 
speculate provocatively on Kleinian object relations. Human 
psychology moves in the direction of the objects humans pro-
duce that are “other” than themselves, evacuated from them. 
The doubleness of our self/not-our-self marks our existence as 
not entirely our own. This route leads him to a close consider-
ation of Eve’s “Bathroom Song,” a poem that moves from her 
fecal matter to Buddhist stuff.
Herring’s essay is supported by the connection Eve makes 
in “Come As You Are,” between letting go of the fecal matter 
that our bodies produce and the letting go of our bodily life that 
death entails. Letting be is not only an answer to the unwelcome 
imperative of death but also a fact of life; we lose “our shit, our 
eyelashes, our hair, our scabs, our skin, our youth, our hips, our 
capacities to reproduce, our minds, our lovers, our parents, our 
bodies, our selves,” Herring details.14 “There is nothing shittier 
than losing something or someone you love,” he continues; his 
sentence applies as much to our self-relations as it does to our 
relation to beloved others. Toilet training is the beginning of a 
lesson in letting go that we come to realize in the death we carry 
with us. This is a recognition, in Buddhist terms, of the transi-
toriness of our lives and selves built on a crumbling, unraveling 
basis of supposed needs and self-aggrandizing desires. “Suppose 
that getting toilet trained is about learning, forcibly, to change 
the process of one’s person into a residual product — into some-
thing that instead exemplifies the impersonal in its lumpishly 
ultimate taboo form,” Eve hypothesizes. “Isn’t this one of the 
tasks of dying as well?” “The silk and the shit again go together,” 
Herring remarks, citing their conjunction in Eve’s therapist, 
Shannon Van Wey’s notes that connect Eve’s fabric arts to the 
14 Scott Herring, “Eve Sedgwick’s ‘Other Materials’,” Angelaki 23, no. 1 (Febru-
ary 2018): 14–15.
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letting go of self that toilet training initiates (Dialogue 206).15 
Letting go is a creative act; it releases a masterpiece, a gift. On 
earlier pages of Dialogue on Love, Eve tells Van Wey about being 
toilet trained at an improbably early age. In his notes, he specu-
lates, or perhaps voices Eve’s speculations about this memory, 
perhaps a shared family fantasy, in which pride in accomplish-
ment meets shame; it fueled her masturbatory practice and ac-
companying sexual fantasies of spanking. “HAVING BOTTOM EX-
POSED” is what they share (190). What’s mused in this material 
is the punch line in “A Poem Is Being Written,” where spanking 
sparks poetic practice and Eve’s creative imagination. Its final 
metamorphosis was the conjunction of Buddhism, Proust, and 
textiles — arts of letting go. 
Herring connects Eve’s late ruminations to her earlier work, 
her focus on anality in Henry James, for example, or the potty 
humor of “Divinity,” an essay/performance piece Eve co-au-
thored with Michael Moon. In it the cross-gender identification 
enacted through the cross-dressed fat body of John Waters’s star 
Divine leads to the scene in Pink Flamingos in which she eats 
shit, a symbolic gesture that defines her abjected shameful ex-
istence. A Buddhist perspective could rewrite this scenario to 
underline the possibility of an impersonal place of belonging 
that has let go of self. This is also a subject in “A Poem Is Be-
ing Written.” There, the aorist agency of the Freudian scene of 
the child being beaten entails the de-agential agency of the anal 
erotics of poetic production.
Herring’s analysis traces a path from the erotic emphasis in 
Eve’s earlier work to her later stress on nondualism, a way of 
putting one thing beside another, life and death in relation by 
way of the sexuality inherent in the non-sexual reproduction 
of anal sex. The paradigmatic instance of this creative conjunc-
tion is a passage in Henry James’s notebook that Eve instances 
and explored in Epistemology (208), Tendencies (99), and Touch-
ing Feeling (47–48). Contemplating his “arrears,” his “inward 
15 The passage also is cited in Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, Touching Feeling: Af-
fect. Pedagogy, Performativity (Durham: Duke University Press, 2003), 22.
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accumulation of material,” James imagines writing as plung-
ing his hand — indeed, his arm — deep within the “sacred and 
cool darkness” of his tabooed bowels, fisting himself to relieve 
himself of the “accumulated good stuff ” that keeps on giving 
itself up. As Eve notes, this scene refuses the distinction of ac-
tive and passive; its two-sidedness refuses dualisms. This source 
is founded (au fond) in the singularity of a pun or two. Herring 
traces a path whose final instantiation he oddly omits to men-
tion. It starts in Epistemology, continued through a seminar at 
Duke that had Wings of the Dove on the syllabus (Michael Moon 
co-taught; I participated) in which Eve tried out her later read-
ing of James, concluding in the last essay she completed before 
her death, “Anality: News From the Front.” She never left the 
behind behind.
*
Herring’s exploration of “fecal object relations” (7) takes him, 
along with Eve, to wonder whether the reparative is as far as 
Kleinian object relations go. “Paranoid Reading and Repara-
tive Reading” often is taken to be Eve’s last word on the subject. 
That 1997 essay, reprinted in Touching Feeling, was not the end of 
her thinking. “Melanie Klein and the Difference Affect Makes,” 
ten years later, along with passages in The Weather in Proust, 
nudge object relations towards the conjunction of shit and silk. 
“Here and there in her writings,” as Herring observes, “questions 
emerge into non-Kleinian — not just non-Lacanian — modes of 
being in the world that might give ‘some possibilities of open-
ing out our relation to the depressive’” (12). He pursues this 
speculation of Eve’s in “Melanie Klein and the Difference Affect 
Makes” along with the recurrence of “possibilities” as a potent 
word in Eve’s vocabulary throughout her career for the process 
of “opening out” (12). It characterizes what she found to think 
about in the texts she explored, as well as in the life she lived, 
facing her continuing desire not to live, finding motives to live 
and to create through her love and interest in others. To counter 
nondualistically the tally of losses that constitute our existence, 
he reminds us of Eve’s resistance to the painful askesis of Eliza-
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beth Bishop’s “One Art” of losing, her offer, instead, of multiple 
arts of “loosing,” a letting go that allows an expansion into “the 
open mesh of possibilities, gaps, overlaps, dissonances” (Ten-
dencies 8) literally realized in Eve’s late textile art. It’s basic to her 
pedagogy, the most instructive scene of which is perhaps the 
one she recounts in Touching Feeling. She faints, passes out; her 
self-absenting could “wrench the boundaries of discourse round 
in productive if not always obvious ways,” she proposes (34). Be-
ing beside herself in this way, opened out, splayed, Eve figures 
the enjambed position of “beside” she affirms in relation to the 
dualisms fostered by the more familiar conceptual relations of 
behind, before, beyond. 
*
Herring’s speculations about possibilities beside the depressive 
draw on the discussion of the topic by Lauren Berlant and Lee 
Edelman in Sex, or the Unbearable, developed from a dialogue 
delivered at the 2010 MLA convention. Berlant questions Edel-
man’s demonstration that Eve’s attempts to open out the repara-
tive always involves negations that, he contends, lead her back 
to paranoid splitting. He insists that her “and” is an alibi for “or.” 
Berlant continually concedes his point, as it relates to her “cruel 
optimism,” but also resists it, most promisingly when she pon-
ders the non-necessity that possibility opens. What is possible, 
after all, is not certain. It escapes epistemological determination. 
Indeed, for something to remain possible it must not yet be or 
at least not be apprehended as such. It exists as the non-exis-
tent possibility of possibility, a perpetual state of non-being and 
not-knowing. She wonders if Edelman’s eternal “no” might be 
nudged in this direction of “the Sedgwickian nonce.”16 She has 
in mind the “nonce taxonomy” of Epistemology (23). It is argu-
ably recalled in Eve’s embrace of non-being in “Making Things, 
Practicing Emptiness.” Affectively, we have seen examples of 
this stance when, for instance, Eve met the dread of death with 
16 Lauren Berlant and Lee Edelman, Sex, Or the Unbearable (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2013), 55.
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newfound interests and energy. It would be difficult to call this 
response merely reparative since it was less about making new 
wholes, more an affirmation of a multiplicity of motives all at 
once. Nothing is excluded in these nonce solutions; even Edel-
man’s dualistic “no” might be folded into it.
It’s worth noting, too, as Berlant does, that sex returns in 
these possibilities, albeit in loosened, non-individualized forms 
of extended relationality. Such possibilities participate in Eve’s 
breathtaking list of what “beside” includes: “a wide range of 
desiring, identifying, representing, repelling, paralleling, dif-
ferentiating, rivalry, tearing, twisting, mimicry, withdrawing, 
attracting, aggressing, warping, and other relations” (Touching 
Feeling 8). It’s not that “and” is a series of “or’s”; “and” and “or” 
belong in a series of relations in which sameness and difference 
are preserved and mooted in the space of possibilities. In her art 
of loosing, Eve writes, “ideally, life, love, and ideas might then 
sit freely, for a while, in the palm of the open hand” (3). What 
we hold on to now is made possible by the realization of life that 
continues in our absence, in our being in non-being, surviving, 
living on. This is how the universe lives and we in it, how “the 
things in it, including oneself and one’s contents” live (Weather 
in Proust 32). It is impossible not to hear — that is, it is possible 
to hear — in the rephrasing of “oneself ” and “one’s contents,” the 
“fecal object relations” of Scott Herring’s “other objects.”
*
The thoughts pursued in “Eve Sedgwick’s ‘Other Materials’” fol-
low from a close reading of “Bathroom Song,” its trajectory from 
the personal to the impersonal. Herring notes for instance the 
many ways in which the opening stanzas identify the “I” of the 
poem with the biographical Eve Kosofsky: the precocity of her 
toilet training, her childhood home in Dayton, Ohio, her sup-
portive parents recognizing their gifted, precocious child even 
in her potty offerings. The final stanza analogizes these scenes 
with a citation from the Heart Sutra. It keeps with the biographi-
cal evidence of Eve’s engagement with Buddhism. Nonetheless, 
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in the representation of the infant Eve by the adult writing the 
poem, the “I,” in Herring’s reading, moves to occupy two posi-
tions at once; her anal matter comes to occupy the position of 
“impersonal matter, Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick as ‘other materials’” 
(10). The precocious one-year-old “outstrips conventional time-
lines,” he continues; this “I” is finally, and at first, “a piece of 
matter that belongs to no one and everyone but the universe” 
(9). Grandma Frieda in the poem is perhaps the grandmother 
from whom Eve learned the weaver’s handshake, the grasp of 
texture that locates oneself peacefully outside oneself. Herring’s 
reading situates the text’s echoes of previous texts as an imper-
sonal extension. It is akin to Buddhist prayer flags that message 
themselves on the wind and water. In “Bathroom Song,” Eve’s 
bodily waste arrives at the ear of her grandmother, and of God, 
as well as the cave of Memory (the Henry James scenario; a 
Proustian scene too). Grandmother is echoed in the face of her 
son, Eve’s father. Eve, bald like him, is transgendered. Renaming 
herself Evita draws attention to the meaning of “Eve” in Gen-
esis through its translation into a proper foreign name — “Eve” 
means life, Being that is. As Herring recalls, the poem first ap-
peared in “Come As You Are,” title of a Nirvana hit that became 
a byword of its time, inviting its audience to come any way it 
wants to be, or was, or is wanted to be, as friend, as enemy, white 
or black, to face the possibility denied of being killed, annihi-
lated, or kept in the refrain of memory. Herring sums up his 
reading as the conjunction of “a playful return to her body’s im-
personal arts and crafts … structured around non-attachment” 
(14). “Bathroom Song,” he concludes, “is, I remind myself, a 
poem” (16). That reminder reminds us of what “and” joins in the 
title of Eve’s course: “Words and Other Materials.”
*
I would put this aesthetic reminder beside Brian Glavey’s The 
Wallflower Avant-Garde, a book about queer ekphrasis that 
takes off from the movement of Eve’s thought. Rather than of-
fering the usual bifurcated early/late Eve divided between epis-
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temological erotic concerns and “abstract questions of affect 
and temporality,” Glavey connects the close readings of “The 
Weather in Proust” (starting with the fountain in Proust as an 
exemplary ekphrasis) with the site of a sexiness for Eve that she 
located early, as she recounts in Tendencies and reiterated there-
after: “for me, a kind of formalism, a visceral near-identification 
with the writing I cared for, at the level of sentence structure, 
metrical pattern, rhyme, was one way of trying to appropriate 
what seemed the numinous and resistant power of the chosen 
objects” (Tendencies 3). In that becoming-object lies an imper-
sonal mode of attachment to the world, “seeing something as 
itself and something else at the same time.”17
Glavey posits a non-dualistic reading of Eve’s oeuvre. Re-
thinking her own rethinking, he arrives at the creativity that Eve 
celebrates, the galvanizing effects of her own self-withdrawals. 
“The performative utterance, according to Sedgwick, behaves 
much as the queer child does in her work, shyly turning inward 
but with electrifying effects on those drawn into her proximity” 
(148). Those effects are bound to the near-identifications, near-
misses, with the objects that draw one, the object-relations Scott 
Herring identifies. “Sedgwick’s meteorological turn thus should 
not be seen as shying away from the sexual,” Glavey insists. It 
participates in the “wallflower avant-gardism defined in part by 
its reluctance to being snared in the sorts of oppositional think-
ing that would pitch the antisocial and the utopian as opposites” 
(3). Eve’s aestheticism is both a mode of attachment and detach-
ment. Nonce-relations allow one for a time to survive fastened 
to what remains when we have parted from this world — the 
world itself and what we may have added to it by having been 
here for a while.
*
17 Brian Glavey, The Wallflower Avant-Garde: Modernism, Sexuality, and 
Queer Ekphrasis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 3.
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Arriving here we approach the conjunction that Judith Butler 
offers in her contribution to Reading Sedgwick (a reworking of 
yet another talk originally delivered at the 2010 MLA conven-
tion). “Proust at the End” is a doubled end in which Eve and 
Barbara Johnson meet. Both died within months of each oth-
er; both were reading Proust at the end. They read him, Butler 
argues, for the kind of “posthumous happiness” that Swann is 
said to have achieved in marrying Odette, a woman for whom 
he has no desire except the desire to live past attachment and 
its attendant jealousy, to live in the life that outlives our own. 
“Posthumous happiness,” in Butler’s analysis, entails proliferat-
ing the self through “connections among humans and things”; 
“It is about being determined in relation to others and to an 
ambient world.”18 Eve and Barbara, she supposes, both enjoyed 
this other way of loving. “Who among us is not in love with Bar-
bara Johnson,” Judy reports Eve as having said. Affirming her 
own love for them both, she closes by claiming “that something 
about that other way of loving is what is happening still … . We 
took her in,” she writes, about Eve, “and breathe her still, with 
surprise, and with gratitude” (70).
*
Butler’s conclusion brings me back to “Eve Sedgwick’s ‘Other 
Materials’,” to something I might have remarked on earlier, its 
dedication to me and Michael Moon. Until Scott sent us a copy 
of his published essay we had no idea he was writing it or dedi-
cating it to us. We have known Scott since his partner Shane 
Vogel had a post-doc at Emory University’s humanities center 
in 2006, but were not involved in his writing of the essay. We 
are the dedicatees, I think, the way we are in the essay, thanks 
to our relationships with Eve, especially our writing-relations 
(my editing The Weather in Proust, Michael’s co-authoring “Di-
vinity”). As Scott indicates movingly at several moments in his 
18 Judith Butler, “Proust at the End,” in Reading Sedgwick, ed. Lauren Berlant 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2019), 69.
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essay, he never knew Eve; yet he writes, he hopes, without being 
misconstrued, of matters intimate to her, matters she shared, of 
course, in writing. “Her writings have been formative to my own 
writing on queer matters as well as my development as a white, 
gay male who came to us queer theory with Sedgwick’s work in 
my pocket” (7). This is how he positions himself early in his es-
say. He ends it this way: “So thank the powers that be for Little 
Evita’s ode de toilette. Schooled at the University of Illinois at 
Urbana-Champaign, I was unable to take one of her classes, but 
these are a few of the queer things that reading up on Sedgwick’s 
waste materials — from her earliest to her latest on “BUDDHIST 
STUFF” — brought to my mind for this journal’s special issue on 
queer objects. Treat this piece as a belated going-away gift for 
all the intimate stuff she never meant to give me, even though 
Sedgwick and I had absolutely no personal relationship what-
soever” (16).
Scott’s expression of gratitude here sounds like Judith But-
ler’s, except that it is offered without the personal knowledge 
of Eve and Barbara Johnson that Butler had; Eve’s writing is a 
gift not intended for him but nonetheless received by him in 
the personal/impersonal exchange that writing affords across 
the abyssal divide in objects detached and attached to ourselves 
as our selves are attached to/detached from shit, silk, bodies, 
words, things.
“Come As You Are” 
Eve’s talk was first delivered at a conference on death and dying 
at SUNY Stony Brook in November 1999. She gave it in conjunc-
tion with an exhibit of her fabric art titled “Floating Columns/
In the Bardo.” I turn to the talk prompted by Scott Herring’s bril-
liant attention to a central, material aspect of Eve’s focus on the 
realization of her own mortality. Her “Bathroom Song” guides 
him, and Eve ends “Come As You Are” by quoting it. He didn’t 
know its original position and put forward what she put behind. 
This forward/backward conjunction fits the position of the “I” 
of the poem, as he noted: the infant Eve cannot be distinguished 
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from its dying author. So, too, with fecal matter: it begins in food 
removed from its organic existence that we need to live; elimi-
nated as waste, it becomes mulch that replenishes soil. The cycle 
continues. The meeting of beginning and ending is where we are 
to come as we are. After.
“I’ll end with one more poem — this one’s about toilet 
training, but it, too, quotes from the Heart Sutra,” Eve con-
cludes. “Death” is the other poem of hers to which she alludes. 
She quotes it in full and recalls lines from it at several points. 
“Come-as-you-are” appears in its second line. Eve quotes “The 
point’s not what becomes you, but what’s you,” as she concludes. 
“Becomes” suggests at once “what makes you look best,” as well 
as “what you will turn into.” The two are connected, fabrics 
might adorn your body, but like other objects, including your 
body, they must be let go. The floating figures exhibited in Eve’s 
bardo — headless, lacking hands and feet — are made of fabric, 
covered in Eve’s textiles, fabric inside and out. 
Connections between what you are and what becomes you 
are pursued throughout “Come As You Are” as Eve repeatedly 
asks who/what am I? “Why textiles, why Buddhism?” Why did 
these “come bounding” into her life as she came to realize her 
mortality? This, she insists, is and remains a real question, de-
murring from the usual stance of authorial control that would 
strive to make it seem as if the arguments and connections in 
her writing were “overdetermined.” To Eve, they remain “under-
determined.” These two terms — and the either/or they might 
suppose — are woven into the discussion at every turn, posing 
its central quandary. The overdetermined “we all must die” that 
we all know is joined to but disjunct from the undetermined 
“we don’t know how or when.” Even Eve’s realization of her own 
death stops short there. The self, its capacity to master situa-
tions, is implicated. We live with a knowledge that we barely 
realize. Eve ponders the moment of realization — “It was the 
time when I learned that the breast cancer for which I’d been 
treated half-a-dozen years earlier had silently metastasized to 
my spine, and had become incurable” (this sentence comes well 
into “Reality and Realization” but at the beginning of “Come As 
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You Are”) — ponders it because the ongoing realization of her 
mortality may make it more real, or perhaps not. Nor can she 
determine the order of events that precipitated the conjunction 
of fabrics and Buddhism. Which came first, and was it before 
or after the diagnosis? Such determinations remain indetermi-
nate, underdetermined. Rather than being able to answer the 
questions she can only wonder. Questions about temporality 
and life, raised at the opening of the talk, recur at its close. Eve 
reports that she has “come to terms” with “a process where end-
less underdeterminations continue to arise and arise in the face 
of one single overdetermination, whose narrative coherence 
will be only retrospective.” She has come to the end of questions 
about ends and determinations, left with what arises and arises, 
a phrase that may remind us of Henry James’s fantasy.
“What are these things doing in my life? I mean my life?” Tex-
tiles and Buddhism come “bounding,” violating the boundaries 
designated by the italicized terms. They come as things, arriv-
ing like the silently metastasizing cancer. Eve opposes the usual 
way of thinking of disease as an enemy to be combated, some 
undisciplined, immature, unruly, antisocial force — an outsider. 
Without saying more, she closes by making clear that fatal dis-
ease often is treated the same way as perverse sexuality is stig-
matized. She advocates acceptance of what is, of what we are.
“Come As You Are” begins with what appears to be a sidebar 
in an opening paragraph about the slide show that accompanied 
the talk, but was not “particularly synchronized with it,” offer-
ing, she stresses, a variety of images of various Buddhisms and 
various textile traditions, each with its own modes of represen-
tation.19 The images, she continues, form “a sort of musical back-
ground or light show.” They are in a relation of ekphrastic ex-
change, two arts at once. As a light show, they show what makes 
them visible, what they are, not merely what they represent. The 
light show thus illuminates the quandary posed by the italicized 
terms my life (whose life is my life?). Buddhist practices of real-
19 Hal Sedgwick, who ran the projector, informs me that he showed some-
where around four hundred slides during the delivery of the talk.
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ization tend in this direction as well, as does work in textiles that 
push back against the maker. In the bardo of death (Dharmata, 
the bardo of reality) “we can recognize the impersonal luminos-
ity of mind …, recognize it not only as itself but as ourselves 
and not other than ourselves.” The light show mentioned as if it 
were an opening aside anticipates what comes after death. (The 
passages in “Reality and Realization” on the bardo light shows 
come in the middle of “Come As You Are.”) At such a moment, 
“the individuating, inexorable, karmic laws of dualistic cause 
and effect will be transformed into, or simply recognized as, the 
overarching, radically underdeterminimg, transpersonal free-
dom called realization.” 
“The point’s not what becomes you, but what’s you.” In 
“Death” the “I” asks, “Why did I buy those silk PJs, with feath-
ers  / so long before the big affair began? / I’ve always slept in 
the nude. Now I sleep in the nude forever.” “Always” becomes 
“forever”; “Now” is the time in which this “I” speaks, a time that 
survives it. It has become what it is, an “I” in a text that illumi-
nates what touching a textile intimates, “a reality, a beauty, that 
wasn’t myself, wasn’t any self, and didn’t want to be” that Eve 
“hungers” to handle. It answers the question “Death” poses. Not 
wanting to be is how to be. “No one sends the message … no 
one receives” it; this no one is you, neither sender nor receiver, 
subject nor object. No one yet not split in two either. What is 
written in the wind is something untraceable, evanescent as the 
moment. It is a matter of forgetting tantamount to realization. 
“Reality and Realization” had intimated the co-implication 
of remembering and forgetting (maternal injunctions, rules of 
hospitality and exchange). “Come As You Are” furthers the dis-
cussion. Seriously joking, Eve wonders where her memory has 
gone, whether everyone’s has, presciently anticipating a present 
in which our memories are stored in our devices and tweets 
replace thoughts. Quietly demurring from a point in Sogyal 
Rinpoche’s Tibetan Book of Living and Dying (quoted far more 
extensively in this talk than in “Reality and Realization”), in 
which he posits the discovery of a true self against the ego to 
which we cling as if it were ourselves. Forgetting, rather, is key 
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to the not-self one is; making things invests one in “things [that] 
neither have nor are opinions and, ideally, cannot be mistaken 
for them.” They have no egos. When we make them (to the ex-
tent they permit) they return us to what we otherwise forget 
we are. In “The Weather in Proust,” Eve links forgetting to pla-
tonism and neoplatonism, anamnesis and Plotinian meditation, 
to the re-minding that is realized in the little gods (cupids) that 
populate Proust’s landscape and beckon towards the other scene 
beside the one we know as our familiar reality, relations other 
than the clinging repudiations of desire and jealousy; those im-
prisonments. Memoria, memoria.
Eve reports herself “annealed into that instant in time,” the 
moment of realization. Fused with it, she is, at the same time 
shattered, unraveled. She is in what is forgotten, mindful in 
mindlessness. Characteristically, at the end of her talk, she won-
ders anew and asks again what she asked at the beginning, “Why 
the object fixation onto fiber art as real? Forget underdetermi-
nation; what can the sublimity of forgetting have to do with the 
hyper-retentiveness of these ‘schmatta studies’?” Are these not 
transitional objects? Asked and answered: are we not ourselves 
transitional objects? Think back to our investment in security 
blankets, worn away by our clinging to them, covered in tears 
and other bodily excretions; go back to toilet training. “Why 
would it be a scandal if the task of dying and those of toddler-
hood such as individuation and even toilet training were not 
so different — were, so to speak, molded of the same odorous, 
bimorphic clay.” These provocative questions lead to the discus-
sion of self and not self, of waste products and letting go, the 
conjunction of shit and satin. The “scandal” of existence lies in 
its nondualistic doubleness: we are part of what we leave behind, 
palpably connected to what is not us. These connections across 
ontological divides also characterize sexuality. In “Death,” we 
are told how to (un)dress for the party, the affair with death. 
We are addressed as “man” by a speaker whose body worries 
seem to include a tummy that needs girdling and elevator shoes 
to add height. Is the “man” so colloquially addressed male or 
female? Is the speaker? “Suppose the many, stubborn, transfor-
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mational negotiations with chosen cloth objects are a medium 
for experimenting with the dimensions and new possibilities of 
this unwelcome imperative” of “letting go.” Eve realized this in 
figures floating in the bardo. 
Same and different, two and one, beginning and end. Eve en-
tertains the unwelcome imperative of death. She returns at the 
end of her talk to Rick Fields, mentioned earlier in the context of 
the kind of academic project that opened “Reality and Realiza-
tion,” and that Eve mentions two thirds of the way into “Come 
As You Are.” Fields explored American (white) Buddhism, now 
he is invoked for how he approached death — his death — as 
a way of life, finding where he was “on the cycle of existence” 
that joins beginning and ending. We are all living dying. To re-
alize that is to find where we are and who we are. Eve likens 
this discovery to the conjunction of AIDS and cancer that had 
occupied her at least from Tendencies on. They join to create 
new forms of relation between persons, genders, races, open-
ing new public spaces. On a personal level, in this “now,” Eve is 
both terminal and alive, doing well and dying, entering thereby 
into a new realms of freedom “both of meaning, relation, and 
memory, yet also from them.” By not holding onto what one 
must let go of, one could identify lovingly with it, “identify,” Eve 
writes, “with the fabric and structure of this discohesive fate it-
self.” To illustrate this, take “Bathroom Song.” Follow one’s shit 
across boundaries to be “utterly gone” into “enlightenment,”
Send the sucker off to Grandma
Gaté, gaté, paragaté;
parasamgaté; bodhi; svaha!
We arrive at the end of “Come As You Are” where Scott Herring 
began; this is where Eve ends and where we (and she) come after 
when we come as we are. 
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“Woven Spaces”
My heading comes from the title of the first of two essays on 
Eve’s work by Katy Hawkins. “Woven Spaces: Eve Kosofsky 
Sedgwick’s Dialogue on Love” appeared in the same issue of 
Women and Performance that included the two poems quoted in 
“Come As You Are.” “Re-Creating Eve: Sedgwick’s Art and the 
Practice of Renewal” is the printed version of the talk that Katy 
(here named Katherine) gave at the Honoring Eve Symposium 
at Boston University on October 31, 2009. Katy Hawkins was a 
dissertation student of Eve’s at the CUNY Graduate Center and, 
as she notes in both essays, intended to publish a book on Eve’s 
creative career. She situates both essays around occasions in her 
relationship with Eve. 
The first is set at SUNY Stony Brook in 1999 when Eve deliv-
ered “Come As You Are.” Katy’s mother, the author of a book 
on illness, also was there; Katy introduced the two women. In 
her essay, she compares their ways of understanding illness and 
death. She extends notions of maternity through a key passage 
in Dialogue of Love (217) in which the encounter of Aeneas and 
his mother Venus applies to the positions occupied by Eve and 
Shannon Van Wey as much as it does to whoever is reading/re-
ceiving her words. Within this widening matrix, Katy poignant-
ly ends her essay by noting how this extended relation prepares 
us for loss, as Aeneas is when he retrospectively recognizes the 
goddess guiding him: “We must gaze at such gifts long enough 
to realize them, so that we can be okay when she is gone.”20
This final sentence locates “Woven Spaces” in the matrix of 
the “after” that is my concern. An essay that begins with a per-
sonal encounter becomes an exchange much like the one that 
ends Scott Herring’s essay. The gift of Eve’s work, enmeshed with 
a recall of Virgil, in dialogue with Anne Hunsaker Hawkins’s 
Reconstructing Illness: Studies in Pathography, extends into the 
capacious freedom of the impersonal; it is exemplified and 
20 Katy Hawkins, “Woven Spaces: Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick’s ‘Dialogue on 
Love’,” Women and Performance 16, no. 2 (July 2006): 266.
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made available in Eve’s “art and practice of renewal,” to recall 
the subtitle of “Re-creating Eve.” Midway through it, the title 
describes Eve’s practice and ours, she mentions that in her talk 
she has discussed Eve’s art works in the order in which Eve first 
showed them to her. Her essay recreates her experience. We are 
surprised to discover that we don’t know to whose agency we 
should ascribe its movement from beginning to end.
These two essays are among the most capacious and sugges-
tive writings to explore the full range of Eve’s creative output. 
“Woven spaces” is but one figure offered to summarize the dou-
ble movement of an opening that affords all kinds of crossings. 
“Nexus,” “matrix,” “knot,” and “tangle” are other terms for the 
time/space explored. From the first sentence of “Re-Creating 
Eve,” in which she looks forward to the publication of “The 
Weather in Proust,” which she has read already, the motives of 
renewal, refreshment and recreation project an “after” into a fu-
ture we may inhabit, a time/space where we may be, where we 
are, in relation to Eve’s oeuvre unfolded in the essay. In what 
follows I trace only a few of these salient conjunctions.
*
One of the ambitions of these essays is to articulate relation-
ships between early and late Eve. In the precis to “Woven Spac-
es,” she writes that in Dialogue on Love “Sedgwick’s approach 
… develops the theoretical concepts from across her oeuvre,” 
immediately glancing at the “historical, formal and theoretical 
matrices” involved (251). From the start, even before the essay 
has begun, it weaves its threads. Its matrix cannot really be con-
fined to a singular topic or account when the strands that come 
together expand to encompass such concerns as “nonlinear 
time, hybrid form, and intersubjective relation.” By the end of 
the precis, a text first said to develop concepts is redescribed 
“as an important extension of her scholarship.” This develop-
ment might as easily be called a transformation. At the same 
time, when couched as a matter of “intersubjective relation,” we 
have to note that the essay argues that Eve faced terminal illness 
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as she had always faced her life: she never supposed her own 
bodily or subjective integrity. 
The concept that links early and late Sedgwick in “Woven 
Spaces” is “queer.” The term is attached to Eve’s subjectivity “as 
an open space for multiple temporal positions” (253; she is both 
herself and not herself), to the mixed form of Dialogue (poetry 
and prose, for starters, Eve’s “I” and Shannon’s in their own type-
face, but not subjectively separate). It extends to Melanie Klein’s 
work: “Reparative motives seem to ‘rhyme’ with Eve’s prior the-
orization of queer ones,” Howkins writes (256). “Seem,” as well 
as the metaphoric use of “rhyme,” suggest at once similarity and 
difference as a way to describe these temporal relations. In Eve’s 
turn to the reparative (paired with the paranoid), she also sees 
“a shift away from anxious, fixated obsession toward a kind of 
detached, curious, relishing interest” that “revives creative inter-
est … generating space for the interplay of multiple positions 
and identifications.” This detachment creates “a gap between 
the present reconstructing self and the past experiencing selves” 
(256). Although that gap might suggest an interruption, a break 
between past and present, it also is the space of renewed creativ-
ity. True to Eve’s thought, Hawkins reformulates either/or versus 
both/and as either/or and both/and.
A couple of footnotes in “Re-Creating Eve” glance at con-
tinuities from early to late Sedgwick. Space, one metaphor for 
what Eve’s work opens as well as the realized terrain it occupies, 
is sketched in note 4. This theme, she writes, becomes “more 
overt”: from The Coherence of Gothic Fiction to the treatment of 
texture in Touching Feeling, a difference within the same emerg-
es, a developmental narrative that still leaves in question the re-
lationship between knowing and realizing. The covert/overt plot 
posits a realization of a truth not so much about who one is as 
it is about what is.
Another continuity is pursued in note 9, the “analogy of 
weaving for writing (and, indeed, thinking)” across Eve’s work.21 
21 Katherine Hawkins, “Re-Creating Eve: Sedgwick’s Art and the Practice of 
Renewal,” Criticism 52, no. 2 (Spring 2010): 281. 
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This note glosses the late loom book Eve made in which threads 
and strips of treated fiber create a multidimensional space across 
which, in various alphabetical shapes, clauses from Proust are 
deployed. “As such, the Loom Book is the very definition of 
Queer work, according to Sedgwick’s definition in Tendencies.” 
The passage she has in mind also is crucial for Jason Edwards in 
“For Beauty Is a Series of Hypotheses?: Sedgwick as Fiber Art-
ist.” It is the one in which Eve defines “one of the things that 
‘queer’ can refer to: the open mesh of possibilities, gap, overlap, 
dissonances and resonances, lapses and excesses of meaning 
when the constituent elements of anyone’s gender, of anyone’s 
sexuality aren’t made (or can’t be made) to signify monolithi-
cally” (Tendencies 8; recall that Fawaz titles his introduction to 
Reading Sedgwick “An Open Mesh of Possibilities”). 
“Mesh,” “gap”: Eve’s first two terms are drawn from weaving, 
a coming together that also is a temporal spacing apart; the next 
phrases, joined by “and” bring together what might usually be 
separated as contradictory. “Elements,” a bit further on, deploys 
a word that could designate the basic materials out of which all 
things are made as well as the letters that form words — what 
we learn in elementary school. All things are made only in posi-
tions/relations. The letters of the alphabet are arbitrary strokes 
meant to mean. Eve’s most immediate reference is to the catego-
ries of identity — gendered, sexual — that either refuse to signify 
singularly or that are refused that capacity. That refusal — those 
refusals — nonetheless can be drawn under the capacious rubric 
of “queer” since it brings together all things athwart, cross-wo-
ven. Eve is not finished defining “queer” in this sentence. The 
next paragraph zooms in to “same-sex object choice, lesbian 
or gay” as “the term’s definitional center,” while the paragraph 
that follows, “at the same time” zooms out to “dimensions that 
can’t be subsumed under gender and sexuality: all the ways that 
race, ethnicity, postcolonial nationality crisscross with these and 
other identity-constituting, identity-fracturing discourses, for 
example” (9). The definitional centers of “queer” are at once an 
“open mesh of possibilities” that also may inhere to the specific-
ity of an orientation.
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Open possibilities stand in relation to what seems closed. 
Eve’s loom book realizes that: it is incapable of being read the 
way the phrases in Proust’s text would be in their sequential en-
counter in a book. The text in the loom has no determinate or-
der. In “Making Things, Practicing Emptiness,” Eve analyzes the 
enforcements of language, sentences, including Proust’s extrava-
gantly long ones, that posit subjects and objects in a determinate 
grammatical order. These sentences, moreover, appear to come 
from a source, an author, and create a subordinate position for 
the reader (Weather in Proust 79, 105). Things evade, open up, 
these positions of propositional knowledge, the domain of writ-
ing. Eve’s trajectory in “Making Things” parallels a quandary 
posed by this relation. She begins as if weaving were a refusal 
of writing, but ends insisting that there was no way for her to 
exclude writing from her weaving. Moreover, despite the eastern 
influence on her craft — binding Buddhism to textiles bound to 
her life — Proust persisted, a long-held love, as textiles were too. 
Both preceded her realization of mortality: they went from be-
ing a means of self-adornment, self-enhancement, self-preser-
vation, to becoming her way to self-abandonment. 
In “Re-Creating Eve,” Hawkins considers Eve’s relation to 
Proust: “her art is perhaps the best place to see the contours not 
just of the Proust she recasts for us, but of the late Sedgwickian 
mode she simultaneously refines.” “Recasts” and “refines” are 
the final verbs in this paragraph used to describe the arc of Eve’s 
career, the “expansive movement in her oeuvre from the propo-
sitional mode of knowingness in, for example, Between Men and 
Epistemology towards a drive in her later work towards themes 
of refreshment and rebirth” (278). These formulations, even as 
they posit differences between early and late also pose them in 
reiterative relations. Indeed, if one glances at the final chapter 
of Epistemology, “Proust and the Spectacle of the Closet,” one 
can see resonances, anticipations of late in early, as Eve explores 
the contradictions between Proust’s reductive statements about 
homosexuality in book four of the Recherche and the figuration 
that conveys and exceeds this propositional content. The closet 
in Proust is multiple, deployed as much as a spectacle supposed-
59
After Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick
ly to be seen through as a space in which hiding is a losing game. 
Reading the “glass closet” of Charlus involves a “volatile baro-
metric career,” Eve writes (Epistemology 228), deploying a figure 
that will become an index to the weather in Proust. Through-
out she is on the lookout for “enabling nexuses of incoherence 
in the text” (226), knots that unravel the choking constriction 
of the laws of desire. These are, as Hawkins writes, the “typical 
weather” in Proust, closed systems that seem closed; Eve “as-
sembles an entirely new Proust” from his “unmatched skill for 
reawakening the vitality of the world” (“Re-Creating Eve” 277). 
The “entirely new” is not located somewhere other than in the 
deadening old.
Arguably, there is a path from the deconstructive strategies of 
Epistemology to Eve’s later work. Her move to making things did 
not mean that she stopped writing. Eve balks in Touching Feeling 
at the infinitizing evacuations of anti-essentialism, not in order 
to reinstate essentialism but to find something beside it, an east-
ern notion of fullness coincident with emptiness, a continuum 
across the ontological divide of life and death located in Being 
(and also in the verb “to be”), a reality principle in which the 
end of anyone’s life, that terminus, coincides with the realiza-
tion of death possible in life. Despite the emphasis on dying and 
the afterlife in the first books Eve read about Buddhism, Sogyal 
Rinpoche’s and Robert Thurman’s recensions of Tibetan explo-
rations of the bardos, these books also can re-orient one to how 
to live. Rather than proclaiming that there is nothing but text, 
these show how nothing will come of nothing. “Deconstruction 
is the theory, Buddhism is the practice,” is Eve’s formulation in 
“Making Things, Practicing Emptiness” (Weather in Proust 75).
*
To return to the queer weave of Tendencies, a page before the 
passage Hawkins cites, Eve anticipates the definitions she offers 
there: “What if … there were a practice of valuing the ways in 
which meanings and institutions can be at loose ends with each 
other? What if the richest junctures weren’t the ones where ev-
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erything means the same thing?” What if they didn’t “line up” 
(6)? The line is reimagined as a juncture, a crossing in which 
things pass over and beside each other, like changing trains in 
a terminal, cleaving together and apart, in a passage that is also 
a knot, the way to what is not self, letting go. The result is rav-
eled selvage, loose ends of the kind Eve left in her weaving, as 
Jason Edwards notes. They mark the materiality of transversed 
boundaries. What is it to be at loose ends? To be in a state of 
mind in which one’s habits and routines are interrupted by an 
unfamiliar emptiness: boredom, anxiety, excitement; to be at 
loose ends also is an activity, or so the supposed origin of the 
phrase suggests. Sailors, when they had a spare moment, were 
enjoined to check the ropes to make sure there were no loose 
ends that might scuttle the ship. To tighten them or to let go? 
*
Retrospectively, as we noted, we are told that “Re-Creating Eve” 
was shaped by the order in which Eve showed Katy her art. First 
comes a piece in which words from Proust are placed on the 
body parts of flexible mannikins that fly through the space of 
a watercolor background, a “matrix” that corresponds to the 
breath of Proust’s narrator’s grandmother that offers an “infinity 
of space” to his “constricted heart.”22 This text metamorphoses 
in the Loom Book citation of the recall of the first visit to Balbec 
recalled in “The Intermittencies of the Heart” section of Sodom 
and Gomorrah, the moment when involuntarily recalling his 
grandmother’s death shakes the narrator’s supposition “that all 
our inner wealth, our past joys, all our sorrows, are perpetually 
in our possession” (4:211); rather, our dispossession brings us 
to what is perpetual. Annihilation meets recreation. Language 
pulses with its self-undoing. Hawkins illuminates the situation 
22 Marcel Proust, In Search of Lost Time, 6 vols., trans. C.K. Scott Moncrieff 
and Terence Kilmartin (New York: Modern Library, 2003), 2:334. Further 
references to Proust in my text will be to volume and page number in this 
edition.
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with an etymology: “Sutra: Sanskrit for ‘thread’” (“Re-Creating 
Eve” 276). Sutras are detachable bits, aphoristic condensations 
embedded in longer texts. “Each thread is designed to be ex-
amined as a free, isolated unit and at the same time the fabric of 
the whole is to be respected” (276). You can pick up a thread at 
any point, the order of the text is not its only order. Buddhism 
and weaving came bounding into Eve’s life at the moment of the 
realization of death in the way that “sutra” weaves together text 
and thread.
The last image in “Re-Creating Eve” features Guanyin, the 
Boddhisatva of Compassion, in triplicate with a Proust text 
set beside the statue in two of its iterations: “As in the classi-
cal landscapes where in the place of a vanished nymph there is 
an inanimate spring, a discernible and concrete intention had 
been transformed into a certain limpidity of tone, strange, ap-
propriate and cold” (Proust 3:55). Cold: the inhospitality of the 
indifferent, impersonal universe, as in Woolf, The Waves, “We 
are cut. … We become part of that unfeeling universe.”23 Proust’s 
analogy is one of several offered to describe the effect of the 
voice of the consummate actress Berma, “which the fascinated 
spectator … took not for a triumph of dramatic artistry but for 
a manifestation of life” (3:55). Guanyin is insistently worldly, as 
Hawkins emphasizes, Eve, too, toward the conclusion of “Mak-
ing Things” when she describes Guanyin’s reserve and accessi-
bility as “relational … but not interpersonal,” an embodiment of 
the Heart Sutra’s “not self, not other, not both self and other, and 
not neither self nor other” (Weather in Proust 104). “And ‘simi-
lar,’” Eve continues, “seems to me to characterize their relation 
to gender … not male, not female, not both male and female, 
and not neither male nor female” (105). A queer conclusion.
Svaha. With that word, Katy closes her journey through the 
images Eve showed her. Untranslatable word at the end of “Bath-
room Song” and the Heart Sutra, it resonates with Eve’s parsing 
of the compactions of “thusness” in “Pedagogy of Buddhism,” 
23 Virginia Woolf, The Waves (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1931), 
280.
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where she writes, “the double movement of an apperceptive at-
traction to phenomena in all their immeasurable, inarticulable 
specificity, and at the same time an evacuation of the apparent 
ontological grounds of that specificity and, indeed, their being. 
The endless vibrancy of this resonant double movement …” 
(Touching Feeling 171). A sentence from Proust can be put beside 
Guanyin because, as Eve noted in her statement about “Works 
in Fiber, Paper, and Proust,” Proust’s language and thought is 
a medium like paper or fabric. It can “reflect the transforma-
tive potential of prolonged immersion in someone else’s mental 
world.” To be “in” Proust is to experience a holding environ-
ment, “simple material metamorphoses [of daily life] as they 
are emulsified with language and meaning” (Weather in Proust 
120–21). “Emulsified” allows for both separation and meeting, 
the material doubleness of what is.
Buddhist thought, as both of Katy Hawkins’s essays show 
over and again, provides the matrix for the final metamorphoses 
in Eve’s formulations in her writing and weaving. Such coming 
together, taking apart is expressed this way by Sogyal Rinpoche:
Nothing has any inherent existence of its own when you re-
ally look at it, and this absence of independent existence is 
what we call “emptiness.” Think of a tree. When you think 
of a tree, you tend to think of a distinctly defined object; and 
on a certain level, like a wave, it is. But when you look more 
closely at the tree, you will see that ultimately it has no inde-
pendent existence. When you contemplate it, you will find 
that it dissolves into an extremely subtle net of relationships 
that stretches across the universe.24
In this passage, the existence of individual objects (the tree, the 
self) is admitted, but as an open mesh of possibilities created by 
the crossing and intersections of a reality that passes through it, 
giving it the potential to be and to go on being. These remain 
24 Soygal Rinpoche, The Tibetan Book of Living and Dying (New York: Harp-
erCollins, 2002), 37.
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possible only by not being entirely realized. Realization, the full-
ness of what is, remains a potential necessarily empty, ready to 
be filled, resonant. Sogyal Rinproche’s language is metaphorical. 
The tree is likened to a wave (once again, I can’t help but recall 
Virginia Woolf), elements cross in a “subtle net” of relation-
ships. The tree can’t be fully divorced from what makes it live, 
yet what gives it life denies it “inherent existence.” What holds 
it together is like the glue in a collage or stitch-binding fabrics 
that marks separation as does every boundary in a collage. “It 
can never be said too often that to realize the nature of mind is 
to realize the nature of things,” Sogyal Rinpoche writes (Tibetan 
Book 48). Even mind is matter, material that is the basis for what 
Eve called Proust’s mysticism, “the beings in the universe are 
filled … with the stuff of the universe” (Weather in Proust 32).
*
“May not thought itself be part of reality as a whole?,” the physi-
cist David Bohm asks.25 Eve devotes a couple of pages to Bohm 
in “Making Things, Practicing Emptiness” (Weather in Proust 
100–101) and alludes to him again at the end of the chapter. 
For Bohm, wholeness requires a rethinking of the whole/part 
relationship like that found in Buddhist thought. Eve’s under-
standing of “thusness” arises from contemplating a version of 
it in the finger/moon relationship of the index and the object 
it points. They are co-dependent. Eve notices Bohm’s favored 
terms to describe this relationship, implicate and explicate; their 
internal fold resonates with a technique in her fabric art, shibori 
tie-dye, fabric folded and opened to show new dimensions. The 
image Eve chose to exemplify this in “Works in Fiber, Paper, 
and Proust” (fig. 16; Weather in Proust) knots together fabric on 
each end; sentences from Proust appear on the cloth; gathered 
they form a new object. It exists as such but also as something to 
be taken in, to the extent it can be, by eyes and mind. In shibori 
25 David Bohm, Wholeness and the Implicate Order (London: Routledge, 
1980), xi.
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“the connection between the folded and unfolded … states … 
is very intimate, but … the … states don’t look even remotely 
alike” (98). For Bohm this is true of the relationship between 
the implicate and explicate states of the universe, joined in the 
movement of reservoirs of energy from which all discrete things 
come and into which they go, endlessly, in a time/space whose 
dimensionality is immeasurable. 
Here it helps to recall that “eternity” and “infinity” are nega-
tive concepts. It is in negation, in nothing, that relation takes 
place. Bohm offers no comprehensive propositional theory to 
explain everything but offers a transformational relation be-
tween two orders whose lack of likeness does not preclude their 
sameness: “in its totality, the holomovement is not limited in any 
specifiable way at all. It is not required to conform to any par-
ticular order, or to be bounded by any particular measure. Thus, 
the holomovement is undefinable and immeasurable” (Wholeness 
and the Implicate Order 191). 
“Holomovement” is Bohm’s term for the (non)relationship 
between a hologram and its object, a nonrepresentational model 
for Bohm for a whole/part relation grounded in emptiness and 
negativity. “Everything implicates everything,” nothing is, ex-
cept in the movement of implication and explication, of uncon-
sciousness and attention to a part that only can be grasped when 
it folds back into the ungraspable. Bohm’s theory derives from 
quantum physics, and its bottom line is “non-continuity, non-
causality and non-locality” combined with “undivided whole-
ness” (223). Speculative, ungraspable: propositional terms gov-
ern Newtonian physics that explain the ordinary reality of the 
explicit; specific concretizations and perceptions make visible 
what makes them possible but not inherent or permanent; pos-
sibility arises and arises from the implicate order, an “immense 
‘sea’ of energy” (243) whose governing laws remain unknown 
and “probably unknowable” (226). This energy joins implicate 
and explicate together/apart “on the basis of a single ground” 
(245) of materiality, where “the holomovement which is ‘life im-
plicit’ is the ground both of ‘life explicit’ and of ‘inanimate mat-
ter’” (247). Being and Non-Being meet in possibility. 
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*
Eve ends “Making Things, Practicing Emptiness” with the Loom 
Book that Katy offers as her penultimate example. The order 
of the images is not their point. This is perhaps conveyed by 
the penultimate image in Eve’s talk, a band of five Boddhisat-
va heads, moving from fully illuminated to dark encasement, 
punctuated with a sentence from Proust broken into words 
and phrases, seven rows of marbled letters at right angle to the 
heads. “The most exclusive love for a person is always a love for 
something else” (2:563). Eve made this one for Michael and me 
(it’s above our living room mantle). It resonates with Eve’s dis-
covery of Shannon Van Wey’s care for her that Katy discusses at 
the end of “Woven Spaces,” where Eve writes “I love that his care 
for me was not care for me” (Dialogue 219). Eve trips on the way 
to an appointment with Shannon, dislodging a patch of earth. 
After her session, unseen, Eve watches Shannon going over the 
same ground, noticing the displaced clod of mulch, patting it 
back where it belongs. Like the voice lodged in Eve’s mind it 
intimates that it’s time to let go, to let be.
After (again)
Proust’s title, In Search of Lost Time, suggests a forward motion 
(à la recherche) towards recovery. It is after what lies behind, it 
comes after what it is after. Recherche is both retrospective and 
reiterative; temps perdu offers similar aporias. Can one find what 
has been lost? Not in Proust’s terms since involuntary memory 
cannot be a matter of voluntary, willed, action. Whatever is 
found coincides with what was lost. Such a search is potentially 
endless. The structure of Proust’s massive novel is recursive, 
leaving the reader with the question whether the text we have 
read is the book the author feels ready to write at the end of 
Time Regained or a prelude to the novel imagined there. The 
novel seeks to unearth what is buried, in the past, in the mind, a 
hidden key to determinations, decisions, desires that, at one and 
the same time, seem accidental, chance occurrences. Surprises, 
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Eve’s focus in “The Weather in Proust,” are moments of refresh-
ment and reincarnation that go hand-in-hand with inexorable 
and inescapable laws. The activity of the novel, intimated in its 
title, is suspended at the nexus of sameness and difference, the 
forgotten and the remembered, a holding environment in which 
one attends to two things at once, something and something 
else, something and nothing.
In “The Weather in Proust,” Eve remarks on the “elastic, per-
meable boundaries in Proust” as particularly hospitable to “the 
Plotinian understanding of universal soul, reality, nous, or good 
that, like Buddha nature, both surrounds and animates the in-
dividual” (Weather in Proust 14). Eve’s densely packed formu-
lation finds support in the double meaning of “individual,” its 
older sense of indivisibility from what one is not and its modern 
sense of being separated as itself. Her sentence brings together 
a strand of neoplatonic thought about a conceptual/moral/on-
tological/psychological/spiritual nexus, each aspect of which is 
designated by a term not equivalent to the others with which it 
is nonetheless grammatically equated. These multiples are ex-
tended by way of “like,” a term that means similar to, but not 
the same as, to “Buddha nature.” In it, inner and outer are in-
determinately joined the way the air we breathe fills our lungs. 
“Nature” takes the place of soul/mind. The word that draws east 
and west into proximity is, perhaps, “animate.” It nudges, too, 
in the direction of animism, maybe of Aristotle’s De Anima. As 
well, its Latin title translates the Greek psuchē, at once mind and 
soul and breath.
In Eve’s late work in fiber, Proust and eastern texts appear, 
sometimes with Buddhist images. Proust and Buddhism come 
together, she notes in “Making Things, Practicing Emptiness,” 
because both “function as touchstones to [her] sense of reality” 
(Weather in Proust 113). Buddhism, a late object of interest, led 
her to “now realize” what she had “always found in Proust” — “al-
ways,” that is, after she read him soon after finishing her PhD, as 
she told Stephen Barber and David Clark (Regarding Sedgwick 
245). The temporal process of now and then is, at the same time, 
a realization that suspends the distance between them in an “al-
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ways” that gestures towards the “reality” in which both partake 
and, at the same time, to which they point. This daily “mysti-
cism” involves “material metamorphoses as they are emulsified 
with language and meaning” (Weather in Proust 113). Emulsifi-
cation is an activity that brings together substances that usually 
can’t mix. Here, this occurs in “language and meaning,” a dou-
blet that might equate those two words and might not. “Material 
metamorphoses” seem to be located in an ordinarily perceptible 
reality (cooking and digesting are two textbook examples of the 
process), but “mysticism” suggests the form of attention Eve 
calls “realization,” an apprehension likely to take your breath 
away — and perhaps available only when that happens, though 
perhaps, too, in dreams, or meditation on the breath that take 
one to the limits of self, its permeable boundaries.
Proust brings us there, Eve notes at the end of “The Weath-
er in Proust,” through aesthetic experience, especially when 
Proust’s narrator recognizes that his talent coincides with, and 
is not threatened by, an art that “is something I am not” (6:240). 
Being an artist involves a metamorphic reincarnation into “this 
being that had been reborn in me” (6:264). These late recogni-
tions are not confined to language, and in the course of the novel 
this art experience is found as well in music, painting, architec-
ture, sculpture, and acting. Proust’s language, as Eve insists, is a 
medium, a transferential one. As Glavey shows, it is ekphrastic, 
and not just in the passage describing the Robert fountain with 
which Eve opens “The Weather in Proust.” The phrase in the 
Vinteuil sonata, Elstir’s brush strokes, indeed almost any de-
scriptive passage in the novel, filled with likes, as thoughs and as 
ifs, conveys the reality that draws Eve. 
*
Before the narrator arrives at his understanding of his talent, 
Bergotte is the writer in the novel whose work intimates this 
impersonal understanding; I turn to him now, although late in 
Within a Budding Grove, where the title metaphorizes young 
women as flowers, en fleur, the painter Elstir takes over the role 
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that Bergotte plays earlier. Elstir’s work is praised for its abil-
ity to suppress demarcations, arriving thereby at a “multiform 
and powerful unity” (2:567). This dividing line is breached in the 
narrator’s first reading of Bergotte when he encounters “a hidden 
stream of harmony, an inner prelude” in what he reads (1:129). 
Plunging into those images, immersed, all ear, he finds himself 
falling in love with the author, “a joy that I felt I was experienc-
ing in a deeper, vaster, more integral part of myself from which 
all obstacles and partitions seemed to have been swept away” 
(130). The “part” of himself found seems at once whole (inte-
gral) and part of an extended, ekphrastic whole. These images 
for the erotics of aesthetic experience draw on analogies with 
music and the visual arts as well as nature (“stream” and “swept 
away” echo in Elstir’s work in which air and water dissolve). The 
“part” realized in language — or, better, in style, stretches back 
to the immemorial, as Bergotte’s language is not current usage 
nor a matter of conscious life. Much is drawn together by the 
“thread” he weaves (1:131). Narrative sequence is sacrificed, cut. 
The reader feels disappointment when it resumes for the joy of 
reading is found in another text woven at the same time. The ac-
cess to the real lies in Bergotte’s “harmonious,” yet “veiled” style, 
and Elstir’s Whistler-like painting answers to these descriptions 
too. What lies “hidden” nonetheless “explode[s] into [his] con-
sciousness” by way of “imagery” (131), words, in this case drawn 
from the visual sphere, for what is otherwise wordless. 
Introduced to “the gentle Bard” by Odette, “the name Ber-
gotte” makes Proust’s narrator “start, like the sound of a re-
volver” (2:164). Bergotte stands before him “like one of those 
conjurers whom we see standing whole and unharmed, in their 
frock coats, in the smoke of a pistol shot out of which a pigeon 
had just fluttered” (165). The scene of the meeting continues 
through the imagery, through a series of “likes.” Out of the gun 
aimed “point blank” at the narrator Bergotte emerges in the 
haze: Shooter and shot change places; the lethal weapon emits 
a pacific dove and, at the same time, the “godlike elder” (163) 
the narrator had imagined from reading Bergotte is replaced 
by “a youngish, uncouth, thickset and myopic little man, with 
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a red nose curled like a snail-shell and a goatee beard” (165). 
The imagined author has “vanished in the dust of the explosion” 
leaving behind only his work. In the description of the scene 
the physically real Bergotte seems less real than the metaphors 
in which he is inscribed. Revolver dust crosses the two domains 
as well as the relation between narrator and narration. So, too, 
upon first reading Bergotte, the narrator had been especially 
pleased to find his own thoughts had already been written by 
Bergotte in “mirrors of absolute truth” (1:132) that are those of a 
conjurer with a magic lantern. Reading Bergotte is a love affair 
akin to his with Albertine, who emerges from the haze of the 
gang of girls, or with Gilberte, “a repetition that manages to sug-
gest a fresh truth” (2:648), or like Swann’s affair with Odette for 
that matter, that began on an “aesthetic basis” (1:582). 
The narrator’s devotion to Bergotte had been consolidated 
after discovering that Swann knows him, that Gilberte is his 
constant companion. He falls in love with her thanks to her 
proximity to Bergotte. Bergotte may descend like a god to raise 
the narrator by way of his “perfected spirit” (2:132), but the “spir-
it” — mind, breath, soul — that penetrates the unknown life, the 
secret life lost in time, is also what the lover seeks in the beloved. 
He loves Gilberte “on account of all the unknown element[s] in 
her life in which I longed to be immersed, reincarnated, dis-
carding my own as a thing of no account,” and it is because of 
Bergotte that he “had first loved Gilberte” (1:582). The two loves 
coincide and reverse like the revolver shot, “now it was above 
all for Gilberte’s sake that I loved him.” Who/what is it that he 
loves?
First meeting Bergotte in person, the Bergotte whom he had 
“slowly and deliberately elaborated for myself, drop by drop, like 
a stalactite, out of the transparent beauty of his books, ceased” 
(2:165). Conjured up by the name Bergotte, perhaps an amalgam 
of the etymological root ber- that in French suggests cradling, 
being held, and Gott, the German word for “god,” dispatched 
by his physiognomy, he is reconstituted by a voice whose mo-
notony and odd inflection create “a plastic beauty independent 
of whatever his sentence might mean” (2:169), the aesthetic ba-
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sis upon which Bloch had recommended Bergotte in the first 
place. In this emulsification language becomes meaningful in its 
meaninglessness, a “harmonious flow of imagery,” to mix meta-
phors (169), that delivers “a priceless element of truth held in the 
heart of each thing.” This element may be the one sought too in 
the beloved. Its pricelessness negatively empties the fullness of 
the thing it is. This is Proust’s heart sutra. “Perhaps there exists 
but a single intelligence of which everyone is a co-tenant, an in-
telligence toward which each of us from out of his own separate 
body turns his eye” (2:195). Eve marks this sentence as Plotinian 
(Weather in Proust 2), and remarks how it corresponds to a Bud-
dhist universal permeation and fullness also found in Proust: 
“Proust has an unusual aptitude … for replotting linear, genetic, 
or hierarchic narratives as images, instead, of synchronous pro-
fusion and companionship — most especially, self-companion-
ship” (15).
“The priceless element of truth hidden in the heart of each 
thing” is “the little drop of Bergotte buried in the heart of each 
thing,” a drop “related to all the rest and recognizable, yet … 
separate and individual” (2:170). We reach here too the heart of 
Eve’s axiom one. Proust continues, “So it is with all great writers: 
the beauty of their sentences is as unforeseeable as is that of a 
woman we have never seen.” Seen and unseen meet here, as do 
the surprise of difference in an elemental sameness of relation.
This element drives Bergotte to his last scene. Just before he 
dies, he goes to see a painting by Vermeer. A critic has remarked 
on a “little patch of yellow wall” in the View of Delft that Bergotte 
cannot recall. Dizzy, fixing his gaze, “like a child upon a yellow 
butterfly that he wants to catch,” Bergotte sees how he should 
have written (5:244), catching at what is fleeting, imperceptible, 
making it visible. Butterflies, metamorphic, animated creatures 
that crawl, then fly, intimate material transcendent metamor-
phoses. This is how the narrator understands Bergotte’s realiza-
tion of the creative life in which one is “obliged to begin over 
again” (245), to write toward the perfection of a patch of yellow 
whose representation responds to no social imperative “given 
sanction in our present life,” but awaits “a world actively differ-
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ent from this one” (246) to receive it; an entirely different world, 
from which we come and to which we return, the narrator posits 
in a characteristic “as if,” that also is in this world, in the art work 
itself. The life of that work is Bergotte’s: “So … the idea that Ber-
gotte was not dead for ever is by no means improbable” (246). 
This is not entirely a consolatory realization, as the narrator had 
found, contemplating his own death “or a survival such as Ber-
gotte used to promise mankind in his books, a survival in which 
I should not be allowed to take with me my memories, my frail-
ties, my character, which did not easily resign themselves to the 
idea of ceasing to be, and desired for me neither extinction nor 
an eternity in which they would have no part” (2:338–39).
Before meeting Bergotte and after hearing from M. de Nor-
pois that he dined with the Swanns, the narrator asks whether 
Bergotte was there. Norpois responds in a way that anticipates 
the reception Proust might have feared for the Recherche, by re-
viling Bergotte’s “manner” as seductive, precocious, thin, “lack-
ing in virility” (2:61), a trifling without foundation, the embodi-
ment of “Art for Art’s” sake. He also deplores Bergotte’s irregular 
sex life. This objection, the narrator, after meeting Bergotte, re-
fuses, seeing his defiance of social convention as making a space 
for the real life he lives in imagining other lives (2:182).26 There 
are two Bergottes, one at home in the social world in which he 
talks incessantly about his “powerful, rich or noble friends in 
order to enhance himself ” (2:180), though also able to describe 
Odette as a “whore” to the narrator (199). His real self is the one 
who writes. It can be attached to a sentence from “The Method 
of Sainte-Beuve” quoted as Proust’s aesthetic credo in the bio-
graphical note at the beginning of each volume of the Proust 
translation I have been citing: “A book is the product of a dif-
ferent self from the one we manifest in our habits, our society, 
in our vices. If we mean to try to understand this self it is only 
in our inmost depths, by endeavoring to reconstruct it there, 
that the quest can be achieved.” Hence Eve’s “interest in using 
26 Although Bergotte’s sex life is heterosexual it is compared with Charlus’s at 
4:13–14. 
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Proust’s language and thought as a medium, one with a texture 
and materiality comparable to other artistic media, that can be 
manipulated through various processes to show new aspects” 
(Weather in Proust 113). So, string together sentences from 
Proust across a loom book that manifests depths. Or, take a sen-
tence, for instance, “The most exclusive love for a person is al-
ways a love for something else” (2:563), parcel it out, divide it be-
tween identical Bodhisattva heads, array word and image across 
a field half white, half black, so that the heads eventually fade 
into darkness, deeply veiled. The words stay lit but nonetheless 
undergo a metamorphosis, from an “exclusive love,” supposedly 
unique and singular, to “a love for something else.” Likewise, a 
person becomes a thing, while the process-in-time becomes an 
“always” as we read. What persists is the single word “love” do-
ing double duty.
“A Pedagogy of Love”
My heading cites a phrase from the opening section of Lana 
Lin’s “Object-Love in the Later Writings of Eve Kosofsky Sedg-
wick,” chapter two in Freud’s Jaw and Other Lost Objects. As Lin 
notes, “love” is a word often coupled with Eve’s name, often by 
those, like her, who never knew Eve. She instances a recent essay 
by Jonathan A. Allan, who declares his love, and surveys that 
of others, including some who knew her (like Michael Moon 
and Jonathan Flatley) and others who did so through her writ-
ing. “Love” is the last word in Hawkins’s “Re-Creating Eve.” Al-
though Katy knew Eve personally, her definition of love points 
in another direction, to “the depersonalized attention that con-
tinually renews our world, inside and out” (280). “Love is the 
spine, the nexus, that holds together Sedgwick’s late work,” she 
continues. That is where we are too, held with her, as she insists 
in closing sentences that string together a definition of where 
that is made of a string of “nots” — “not a vase, not a jar, not a 
body, not a loom or a book or a heart.” This holding environ-
ment is “nothing that can be contained or created.” Lin suggests 
something similar when she defines Eve’s “pedagogy of love” as 
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“reparative work” consisting of “acts of impersonal and anony-
mous love. Through a generalized care for the world,” she con-
tinues, “Sedgwick learns to care for herself as an object of love”; 
“Sedgwick learns how to grasp what sustains her by paradoxi-
cally letting go.”27
“Grasp” is a difficult term here since it seems to give agency 
to someone who, “paradoxically,” is “letting go,” not grasping. 
“Impersonal and anonymous,” likewise, when Lin rephrases 
Eve’s care as “generalized,” translates the negative/privative “im” 
and “a” into the inclusive totality of those who have something 
in common. One key to these difficulties can be found perhaps 
toward the end of Lin’s chapter when she cites Lee Edelman’s 
paradoxical definition of loss: “Loss is what, in the object-rela-
tion, it’s impossible to lose” (Sex, or The Unbearable 47). Loss, 
Lin glosses, “materializes to fill that gap” (Freud’s Jaw 109), fill-
ing what’s lost. Although reparation cannot repair the loss, it 
does make the need for repair something we all share. Loss be-
comes something we cannot live without.
Lin’s account imagines a time before our loss. Edelman’s 
statement tends in the opposite direction. Loss not only is ir-
replaceable, it is the condition of our being from the start, or at 
least once the subject becomes a subject after entering the Laca-
nian Symbolic. Before that, the phantasmatic Imaginary is a site 
of wholeness and oneness. Eve’s education, and ours through 
hers in Lin’s statements, is a similar temporal process. She los-
es her breast and realizes her mortality. We had her and then 
we lost her, entering into the bardo of death-in-life with her. 
However, in Buddhist teaching, that privileged moment of real-
ity and realization is one we could see anytime. We never were 
whole, never “had” inherent existence. Lin subtitles her book 
“Fractured Subjectivity in the Face of Cancer.” Does “in the face 
of ” mean before or after cancer? Eve’s pedagogy, I venture, is 
about the time when we are suspended the way her figures in 
the bardo float.
27 Lana Lin, Freud’s Jaw and Other Lost Objects (New York: Fordham Univer-
sity Press, 2017), 83. 
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*
Allan formulates his love this way: “One of the things I love most 
about Sedgwick is that she gives permission to think in different 
ways, to embrace the challenge of being less paranoid, less anx-
ious, less worried.”28 The challenge of being relieved? Like Lin’s, 
Allan’s seems an uplifting project. He writes about the “comfort” 
he gets from Eve just before the sentence I just quoted. Being 
“less paranoid, less anxious, less worried” may mitigate Edel-
man’s insistence on paranoid vigilance against false hopes of 
repair, but it has to be recognized that Eve’s pedagogic project 
was double-edged, less the altruistic self-sacrifice for others that 
Lin imagines, more an invitation in the direction of Dickinson’s 
recognition that “I’m nobody. … Are you nobody too?” Those 
lines can seem saccharine and coy, but perhaps are closer to the 
bracing humor Lin finds in Eve’s writing. It’s in evidence when 
Eve asked a reporter in answer to his question about her can-
cer — whether they “got it all” — “what part of the word ‘system-
ic’ don’t you understand?” (Freud’s Jaw 86). Ouch. Zinger.
Eve’s pedagogy involved making people smarter, as she and 
Shannon Van Wey agreed; it can make one smart. It involves 
recognizing one’s stupidity, something that Eve confessed of-
ten; the knowingness she fosters lies in the realization that it’s 
not one’s own. Lin’s love is identificatory; it embraces sameness. 
Her description of the moment she fell in love with Eve — “this 
Eve I have never met and yet somehow know and love” (Freud’s 
Jaw 114), as she finally and movingly puts it — was ignited by 
the response to her breast cancer Eve gives in “White Glasses,” 
where she writes, “Shit, I guess I really must be a woman” (Ten-
dencies 262). Lin writes, “I had the same reaction Sedgwick had 
upon reading Silvan Tompkins. I nearly fell out of my chair. As 
a woman who has never completely identified as a woman per 
se (or as a man, for that matter), I was both shocked and pleas-
antly surprised that someone else would have shared my lack of 
28 Jonathan Allan, “Falling in Love with Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick,” Mosaic 48, 
no. 1 (March 2015): 5.
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female identification” (Freud’s Jaw 98). It’s hard to say what is 
“the same” here. Eve’s response to cancer is conflated with feel-
ings she and Adam Frank, writing jointly, had, finding them-
selves found by a text. Lin discovers that Eve shares her own 
incomplete identification. But is her lack of male identification 
the same as Eve’s identification with gay men? Rather than try-
ing to parse the same by way of a point-by-point correlation, it 
helps to recall Lin’s thesis about part-objects, and the difficulties 
posed for sameness if no subject is whole to begin with. Did Eve 
identify as a woman or not? Did cancer make a difference in her 
identificatory processes? Finally, there is a question of tone — of 
style — in Eve’s response. What is “shit” doing here?
Lin continues her account of how their shared lack of female 
identification “was the start of an identificatory love with Sedg-
wick … only enhanced when I discovered from her husband, 
Hal, that she and I shared the same oncologist” (Freud’s Jaw 98). 
Again, a sharing of the same, “We had undergone some of the 
most intimate, invasive, and terrifying procedures at the behest 
of the same doctor.” Did they therefore have the same experi-
ence? Lin elaborates, by way of a similitude, “It was like finding 
out we had slept with the same person, or that we had the same 
mother.” How are these discoveries of the same? Indeed, how 
can likeness explain sameness when “like” means, precisely, like, 
not the same? Perhaps, for Lin, everything comes to the same 
thanks to a Freudian, oedipal psychological framework. Can 
one come to the same by way of difference? 
*
How does one fall in love with a writer? Barber and Clark 
broach this question at the conclusion to “Queer Moments: The 
Performative Temporalities of Eve Kososfsky Sedgwick,” their 
introduction to Regarding Sedgwick. They read Adam Frank and 
Eve’s response to Silvan Tomkins as part of a “melancholically 
incorporating fantasy” (49), Klein’s depressive reparative posi-
tion. Adam and Eve’s advocacy of Tomkins — his bringing them 
out — entailed, as Barber and Clark stress, the realization of a 
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theoretical moment not their own, not along an identificatory 
route, almost as an impasse to it. “Like loving, reading extends 
along so many dimensions that aren’t really well described in 
terms of distinguishing decisively between object-choices, ‘this 
theoretical moment is mine, but that one is hers,’ and so on” 
(49–50). Barber and Clark sound like Eve here. 
“Is it possible to be rescued by a book?” Annamarie Jagose 
asks, in reference to her own encounter with Eve’s writing.29 
It was, she answers, “something like what I imagine it would 
feel like to be fired from a cannon, spangled and spectacular, 
newly aerodynamic, holding everything together … courtesy of 
an extrinsic propulsive force” (379). It takes Jagose only a few 
sentences to record her realization that her “likes,” her similes, 
come from Eve’s own description of reading Proust. Shot from 
a cannon, and surviving — how? — by being decimated, liber-
ated, by a force not one’s own; the vitality Eve claimed as Craig 
Owens’s.
At the end of “Thinkiest,” Jagose attaches her love for Eve 
with Adam and Eve’s for Tomkins. She describes it as a “one-
two punch”: They love his writing and want us to love it too; 
they love it because it loves them, and that’s why we should 
too. A “one-two punch” is not exactly a two-way street. It is a 
knock-out delivered, Jagose suggests, by “stylistic extravagance.” 
Reciprocity crosses itself in a “transferential scene of writing” 
that Jagose describes as a “gaffe” (381). Their presumption that 
their being loved makes them lovable to us is a faux pas, a lapse 
in manners, a breach of the unconscious. Extravagance comes 
from without — “extra-.” It is, to recall Hawkins, “the deperson-
alized attention that continually renews our world, inside and 
out” (“Re-Creating Eve” 280). Barbara Johnson called this style 
“bringing out.” Hawkins analogized the process by way of a Zen 
koan: “To find me, look here. To find me, look elsewhere” — the 
finger and the moon in Eve’s Buddhist pedagogy. Eve describes 
this as Gary Fisher’s style, in that “For all its imposing reserve 
and however truncated, Gary’s is an idiom that longs to traverse 
29 Annamarie Jagose, “Thinkiest,” PMLA 125, no. 2 (March 2010): 378.
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and be held in the minds of many people who never knew him 
in another form.”30 A definition of love, re-served, held back, 
stored for future use; truncated, cut short, cut off, capable of be-
ing distributed, disseminated transversely, athwart, aslant, and 
of being received as being-held. Active-passive change place or 
occupy the “same” place. Fisher’s style is his own idiolect and is, 
“paradoxically” for “many people” who are like-minded, mind-
ful that a mind “has never been liberated  / It has never been 
deluded / It has never existed / It has never been non-existent.” 
This is as Dudjon Rinpoche puts it in a passage on mind that Eve 
cites (Weather in Proust 209).
*
How to mind Sedgwick might be the pedagogic question that 
remains. To answer it, I return to Philomina Tsoukala’s essay, 
“Reading ‘A Poem Is Being Written’: A Tribute to Eve Kosofsky 
Sedgwick,” mentioned earlier. Tsoukala encountered “A Poem 
is Being Written”31 at a gathering of lawyers organized by Janet 
Halley and Jeannie Suk at Harvard in summer 2009. The group 
met to consider how queer thought about gender might play a 
role in family law. Among the assigned readings were Eve’s es-
say, which was first published in Representations in 1987, as well 
as the text by Freud that inspired it (“A Child Is Being Beaten”). 
“Our idea in selecting these two texts was to put the question of 
masochism directly to the group,” Halley writes in her introduc-
tion to the issue of Harvard Journal of Law and Gender in which 
some of the papers presented by participants were gathered. 
From the punishment imagined in Eve’s essay, Halley continues, 
arose “the text, the context, the matrix, the text of her desire to 
inhabit and transform the power wielded by her parents.”32 Eve’s 
30 Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, ed., Gary in Your Pocket: Stories and Notebooks of 
Gary Fisher (Durham: Duke University Press, 1996), 291.
31 Eve Kosofsky Sedgwicl, “A Poem is Being Written,” Representations 17 
(Winter 1987): 110–43.
32 Janet Halley, “A Tribute from Legal Studies to Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick: 
Introduction,” Harvard Journal of Law & Gender 33, no. 1 (Winter 2010): 
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insight could reframe family law in its efforts to distinguish a 
nurturing environment from an abusive one.
Four of the papers pursue these connections. However, Tsou-
kala chose instead to pay tribute to Eve by describing what read-
ing her “felt like,” believing that her “fellow panelists would do 
a much better job … linking Sedgwick, Freud, and family law” 
than she could do. It “felt like Eve Sedgwick had just done some-
thing with me or to me” (“Reading A Poem is Being Written” 
347). It had “the feel of a gradual undoing. … A hand was com-
ing out of the frame to take away one layer, which then revealed 
another hand, taking off another layer” (346). She described this 
experienced as an “unveiling of herself ” (346), in which the self 
in questions was also that of the author. Following Eve’s self-
exposure, not wanting to “keep her own ass covered” (347), 
Tsoukala declined to write the expected academic paper. Her 
experience had been “more like … a sadomasochistic erotic re-
lationship” of domination and empowerment, “letting me think 
I had control and then withdrawing it, spanking me and then 
consoling me.” Her response doubles Eve’s “visibly chastised” 
style (Tendencies 177). What, finally, did this “obligatory resigni-
fication of her violence as love” feel like? “I finished reading the 
text and it felt like I had just had sex with Eve Kosofsky Sedg-
wick” (“Reading A Poem is Being Written” 347).
Tsoukala recognizes that her itinerary of reading corresponds 
to the one that Eve imagined, “a fantasy that readers or hearers 
would be variously — in anger, identification, pleasure, envy, 
‘permission,’ exclusion — stimulated to write accounts ‘like’ this 
(whatever that means)” (Tendencies 214). “Anger,” “Identifica-
tion,” “Pleasure and Envy” head sections of Tsoukala’s essay: 
anger at discipline, being forced to pay attention to Eve’s words; 
identificatory pleasure at feeling that Eve knew her “personally” 
(she responds by calling Eve “Eve”), coupled with amazement 
at what treasure lay hidden (“nuggets”) in parenthetical throw-
aways. “Here she was, an author merely three years older than 
me, who seemed to be years ahead of me in emotional percep-
311.
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tion and analytical power” (“Reading A Poem is Being Written” 
343). “Ages ahead,” yet always throwing her off by going back 
again, making undoing the route to progress, like “just when I 
thought I had a hold on what it was exactly that she was doing, 
she straddled the paragraph and themes apart, leaving me at the 
mercy of her (it is now me who can barely stop herself from say-
ing, parental) guidance” (345). 
Tsoukala, like Bottom in A Midsummer Night’s Dream, takes 
all the positions on offer in Eve’s list. “Permission” is in scare 
quotes as is “like,” insisting thereby on the self-difference in the 
terms themselves. Is permission granted or taken? “Permission” 
is in doubt because agency is, uncannily, control and letting 
go. Is “like” a matter of liking or likeness, of sameness, when 
its possible manifestations include exclusion? This early essay 
of Eve’s — written after Between Men, and at an impasse in The 
Warm Decembers and before her work as a queer theorist — an-
ticipates her late work. The enjambment that keeps catching up 
Tsoukala, pushing her back as she works to go ahead, opens on 
the possibilities of emptiness. At the end of Eve’s essay, and of 
Tsoukala’s as well, Eve comes out as a gay man by claiming a 
relationship between female anal pleasure (hers, in the dilated 
sphincter of an essay that keeps letting you in and pushing you 
out) and gay male sex. Tsoukala has sex with Eve, two wom-
en together in the weave created by the huge “empty space” of 
identification-across that Eve claimed was afforded by the anus 
(Tsoukala too). Tsoukala writes, “I was titillated and aroused 
by her discussion of, desire for, and reclaiming of women’s anal 
pleasure” (“Reading A Poem is Being Written” 347). They meet, 
in the productive, creative site of evacuation.
*
The erotic, personal/impersonal space that draws Tsoukala and 
Eve together has been claimed as public by Melissa Adler. Eve 
sought to undo the restrictive Library of Congress subject cata-
loguing of books that, for example, classified Epistemology of 
the Closet as “American fiction — Men authors — History and 
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Criticism.” Thus, her “theoretical positions on the performativ-
ity and relations of texts to one another and their readers un-
dergird each chapter” of Adler’s book.33 Eve’s remarks on the 
self-constitutive role of reading in Tendencies (4) underlie her 
project. The library is a site of perversity, she insists in her intro-
duction titled “A Book is Being Catalogued,” which riffs on Eve 
and Freud and quotes from “A Poem is Being Written” where 
Eve proclaims the library as queer territory, the place that makes 
her feel “so, simply, homosexual.” It was there, once she got the 
hang of the system that occults such knowledge, she found that 
her “wild guesses” were “almost always right.” “If information is 
being withheld (and to recognize even that is a skill that itself 
requires, and gets, development),” she writes, “must it not be this 
information?” (Tendencies 207).
The library is an erotically charged space, Adler comments, 
“Some might even regard the pleasurable experiences of brows-
ing and losing and finding oneself in the stacks as an exercise in 
sadomasochism” (Cruising the Library 14). The library seeks to 
cordon off knowledge into disciplinary categories, but the per-
verse reader can thread her way through the disciplinary maze 
at its points of breakdown, re-piecing what has been separated, 
a reparative project undertaken by the sadomasochistic subject. 
Adler cites an essay by Donald E. Day that “calls for moving 
beyond the ‘user’ as generally conceived by information science 
toward a conceptualization that views subjects and objects as 
co-constitutive and co-emergent with ‘in-common zones for af-
fects between bodies’” (173). In such a formulation, subjects and 
objects meet in the “in-common” between, a space in which dif-
ferences, even those between the living and the dead, cease to 
matter as such. This is also to say that this nothing that matters 
is what is.
*
33 Melissa Adler, Cruising the Library: Perversities In the Organization of 
Knowledge (New York: Fordham University Press, 2017), xiv.
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Arriving here again at questions about likeness and difference, 
identity and identification. I draw towards a conclusion thanks 
to work by two former students of Eve’s, Jonathan Flatley and 
José Esteban Muñoz. Flatley’s “Unlike Eve” was delivered at the 
Boston University conference on Halloween 2009. His title re-
flects a question that he was asked after giving a job talk at Har-
vard, “What makes you different from Eve Sedgwick.”34 His re-
sponse was flummoxed since he wanted to answer with “a fierce 
avowal of my desire to be like Eve” (“Unlike Eve” 229). What he 
should have said, Eve suggested to him afterwards as they talked 
about his humiliating experience, was what she would have said 
in his place, “Unlike Eve Sedgwick, I would take a job at Har-
vard” (229). There is a dizzying play of saying no and yes here, of 
likeness and unlikeness at once in Eve’s witty, scathing response. 
These latitudes are crucial in Jonathan Flatley’s 2017 book, Like 
Andy Warhol, which emphasizes how likeness, since it does not 
mean same as, can be a queer route to difference.
One such extension is José’s subject in “Race, Sex, and the 
Incommensurate: Gary Fisher and Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick,” re-
published in Reading Sedgwick. It was first published in 2013, 
the year of his untimely death, and initially delivered at the 2010 
MLA convention. He takes off from Eve’s fantasy about the re-
ception of “A Poem is Being Written” and allies it to Jean-Luc 
Nancy’s project in Being Singular Plural and later work on sense 
and the commons. “A commons of the incommensurate” found 
in Nancy is not liberal equivalence which reduces others into the 
same, a form of domination.35 Rather, it is an in-commonness 
made “along relational lines,” since that is what we all share. We 
are all in relation to each other, neither self-constituted, nor self-
same. The self-distantiation that, for example, separates Gary 
Fisher’s poetics of racial submission from politics can be put 
beside the empowerment of Eve’s masochistic poetics. Neither 
34 Jonathan Flatley, “Unlike Eve,” Criticism 52, no. 2 (Spring 2010): 228.
35 José Estaban Muñoz, “Race, Sex, and the Incommensurate: Gary Fisher 
and Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick,” in Reading Sedgwick, ed. Lauren Berlant 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2019), 161.
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position is a straightforward re-inscription of the identity poli-
tics associated with race or gender. Eve and Gary Fisher share 
an identity in writing that touches on the irreducible plurality 
that Nancy affirms. Being not-one (nonce) is what each of us has 
in common. Commonness does not erase difference in finding 
grounds for likeness. It is a modus vivendi, the route towards “a 
living in common” (“Race, Sex, and the Incommensurate” 162) 
in a world we all share differently, differentially, a likeness that 
could as readily include hating as liking.
“Eve was abundantly and enthusiastically available for vari-
ous practices of resemblance, identification, and imitation,” Jon 
Flatley concludes the introduction of his essay (“Unlike Eve” 
225). Barber and Clark juxtapose Eve’s fantasied reception and 
response to “A Poem” with her announcement of “availability,” 
modeled on Michael Lynch’s “availability,” in “White Glasses” 
(Tendencies 261). “Being available for identification to friends, 
but as well to people who don’t love one,” Eve writes, “even to 
people who may not like one at all or even wish one well” (cited 
by Barber and Clark 19). This was her position she affirms as 
a queer theorist at the opening of “Making Things, Practicing 
Emptiness,” commenting on making herself “available,” where 
she writes, “To be able to fill this role for a while, and substan-
tially affect the shape of some antihomophobic approaches, was 
a tremendous privilege” (Weather in Proust 70).
The meaning of such “availability” is raised by Anne-Lise 
François in “Late Exercises in Minimal Affirmatives.” Her essay 
about Eve develops from Open Secrets, a book that she describes 
as about nothing, making nothing happen, about minimizing 
attachment to a world minimally attached to you. Availability to 
being hated or loved, making oneself — or, better, parts of one-
self that do not cohere as one self — available, invites the sharing 
(out) that José Muñoz explored. In “Queer Patience,” Karin Sell-
berg also invokes Nancy and describes Eve’s availability in terms 
of the “open mesh of possibilities” enunciated in Tendencies. 
Sellberg posits that Eve’s readers “become individual little parts 
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of the continually expanding set of relations that is Sedgwick.”36 
By “Sedgwick” Sellberg means Eve’s writing: “We find one an-
other in the poetic flow of her phrases, words, and inflections” 
(“Queer Patience” 199). “Her writing,” she writes, “is a space that 
simultaneously opens us up and brings us together” (200).
François links Eve to Roland Barthes and William Empson, 
joining them in their advocacy of “ease, effortlessness, instane-
ity, precarity,” as they offer themselves up to the transience of ex-
istence, to coming as we are.37 Eastern thought and texts model 
this availability. Barthes comments that the haiku, which seems 
at once to bear no meaning and yet is perfectly intelligible word 
by word, is a way of being available and dispensable — “dispos-
able, serviable,” (quoted in “Late Exercises” 39). Availability 
marks how we are, how Eve offers herself in granting “permis-
sion” to let go. François points to the dystopian side of this po-
sition especially now in an academy performed by disposable 
workers or in the deskilling of labor enjoined by superficial (or 
machine) reading; more specifically in Orientalizing dangers in 
the critics she compares to each other. However, she concludes, 
and I with her, that their stepping aside is “not simply a lapse 
or a checking out” (50). Or, if it is a “checking out” (in another 
sense of the phrase, attending to), it involves regarding what is 
when we are not. 
36 Karin Sellberg, “Queer Patience: Sedgwick’s Identity Narratives,” in Read-
ing Sedgwick, ed. Lauren Berlant (Durham: Duke University Press, 2019), 
194.
37 Anne-Lise François, “Late Exercises in Minimal Affirmatives,” in Theory 





Come As You Are
Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick
Eve delivered this talk at a conference on “Transforming the Cul-
ture of Death and Dying In America,” organized by the Humani-
ties Institute at SUNY Stony Brook on November 18–19, 1999, and 
again at the CUNY Graduate Center on March 21, 2000. Melissa 
Solomon quotes from the copy of the Stony Brook talk that Eve 
gave her, and which she kindly copied for me as I was prepar-
ing the paper for publication, in “Flaming Iguanas, Dalai Pandas, 
and Other Lesbian Bardos (A few perimeter points).” My copy text 
was thought to be “the only known ms. of this paper,” as David 
Kosofsky wrote on the copy he sent me on June 28, 2009. I have 
adopted the fifteen or so small handwritten insertions in it to a 
text otherwise almost identical to Melissa’s copy of the original 
talk. Both are headed identically, with Eve’s full name and “SUNY-
SB Conference” below it in the top left corner. The emendations 
seem likely to have been made for delivery at CUNY. In the opening 
section, the phrase that reads “that time, by now almost four years 
ago” originally read “that time, three, by now almost four years 
ago.” The paragraph late in the essay that opens “A few months 
ago, getting a checkup, I mentioned to my oncologist an academic 
conference on death and dying,” originally read “Last week, getting 
a checkup, I mentioned this conference to my oncologist.” Maggie 
Nelson reports on the talk and accompanying exhibit in “In the 
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Bardo with Eve Sedgwick.” Nancy K. Miller includes some obser-
vations on it in “Reviewing Eve.” 
I have left stand the capitalization of Eve’s title that I changed 
to more conventional usage in my essay on her, assuming the on-
tological significance of not capitalizing “you.” The notes to the 
photograph by Joseph Rock and the interview with Rick Fields are 
in the original manuscript. Eve did not note the source for her 
quotations from the Heart Sutra. They appear to be based on the 
translation distributed by the Kuan Um School of Zen founded by 
Seung Sang in 1983, available on the Providence Zen Center web-
site. It is not identical to the similarly lineated much abbreviated 
text and commentary of the Mahā Prajñā Heart Sutra in Sang’s 
Compass of Zen.
Come as you Are
Let me start with a word about the slide show, which isn’t par-
ticularly synchronized with this talk but meant to form a sort 
of musical background for it. Textiles and Buddhism are two of 
the main things I’m talking about today, so the slides represent, 
although sometimes rather loosely, a collection of images of tex-
tiles in and around Buddhist culture and practice. Most of the 
pictures come from five places in Asia: the Kathmandu Valley in 
Nepal, from central Tibet, from Kyoto, from the Dazu grottoes 
in Szechuan, or from the old capital at Ayutthaya in Thailand. 
So they include quite a lot of variety in terms of their Buddhism, 
in terms of textile craft, and also in terms of representational 
idiom.
Now, I think many of these images are very beautiful, but if I 
may ask a rather blunt question, what are these things doing in 
my life? I mean, in my life? Why textiles; why Buddhism? I know 
it’s way out of line for a speaker to ask this question, except in 
a rhetorical way. It’s my job to make my topic, whatever it may 
be, seem so overdetermined as to be entirely inescapable. I’m 
not supposed to still be wondering, or to admit it if I do wonder. 
But I do still wonder, and I wondered it even more at the time, 
three or four years ago, when these two motives, the textiles, the 
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Buddhism, came bounding into my life. In so many ways, the 
point of them for me was to be way underdetermined. I think 
back on that moment a lot — I mean a lot, maybe even compul-
sively — because it bears so much the stamp of mortality, my 
mortality. It was the time when I learned that the breast cancer 
for which I’d been treated half-a-dozen years earlier had silently 
metastasized to my spine and hence had become incurable.
Actually, it was just before this diagnosis that I was finding 
that I had fallen suddenly, intrusively, and passionately in love 
with doing textile work. That is, before the diagnosis, but I think 
it may have happened after I started having the neck pains that 
were misdiagnosed for several months before they turned out 
to represent the cancer recurrence. I can’t exactly remember the 
order in which things happened, actually. I just found myself 
cutting up fabrics to make into other fabrics — appliqués, col-
lages. It was also before the diagnosis, though also I think after 
the pain started that I found myself reading about Tibetan Bud-
dhism.
When I say this moment bears the stamp of mortality, the 
image seems to be almost literal. You know how, when you get 
traumatic or really life-changing news, the people you happen 
to be with at that moment become special to you just because 
of being annealed into that instant of time? It’s like that. In fact, 
even to wonder about the Buddhism, the textiles, their conjunc-
tion, their sudden and by now very big presence in my life —  it 
could be that the sense of wonder represents a way to let myself 
keep revisiting that time, by now almost four years ago, when 
the abstract knowledge of my mortality got so shockingly per-
sonal and real. I don’t know whether revisiting it so much is 
more a way of making its realization not real, or more real, to 
me today.
*
Anybody’s engagement with Buddhism, in a culture to which 
it’s so far from native, marks a distinct moment within many 
diverse histories. For me it was closely linked to this most ordi-
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nary and yet oddly privileged of encounters, the tête-à-tête with 
mortality. Such encounter does involve a privilege, though not 
an absolute one, with respect to reality. As advertised, it does 
concentrate the mind wonderfully, even if by shattering it, and 
makes inescapably vivid in repeated mental shuttle-passes the 
considerable distance between knowing that one will die and re-
alizing it. If anything, with all the very exigent lifelong uses that 
each of us has for the idea of dying, whether shaped by depres-
sion, hysteria, hypochondria, existential heroics, coupled with 
the seemingly absolute inaccessibility of our own death to our 
living consciousness, death offers in both Western and Buddhist 
thought the most heightened example of reality, where reality is 
taken to indicate precisely a gap between knowing something 
on the one hand, and on the other understanding it as real.
*
Here’s a poem I wrote just shortly after that time:
Death
isn’t a party you dress up for, man,
it’s strictly come-as-you-are, so don’t get too
formal, it’s useless. Don’t grab that prosthesis,
those elevator shoes, or girdle to jam your tummy
in, for your interview with Jesus or
forty-nine days in the bardo of Becoming.
The point’s not what becomes you, but what’s you.
Why did I buy those silk PJs with feathers
so long before the big affair began?
I’ve always slept in the nude. Now I sleep in the nude forever.
*
Actually, I’ve always loved textiles. I used to sew my own clothes, 
though ineptly, back in college when I had time for it and no 
money, and the feel of any kind of fiber between my thumb and 
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fingers, in a gesture I probably got from my grandmother who 
also taught me to crochet and embroider, just is the rub of real-
ity, for me. It’s funny that the same brushing-three-fingers ges-
ture is mostly understood to whisper of money, the feel of the 
coin, as a bottom-line guarantee of reality. I’ve learned that it’s 
also called “the weaver’s handshake,” because of the way a fabric 
person will skip the interpersonal formalities and move directly 
to a tactile interrogation of what you’re wearing.
So, I’ve always loved textiles, without doing much about 
it, but something different was happening right around then, 
something that kept kidnapping me from my teaching and writ-
ing tasks and pinning me to my kitchen table with a mushroom-
ing array of “arts and crafts” projects and supplies. Why? Here’s 
one thing that was different: I think I was finally giving up the 
pretext of self-ornamentation, to which my love of textiles had 
always clung before. I had all these gorgeous clothes I’d bought 
but never ever wore. It’s funny that it wouldn’t happen before 
age forty-six, or that it could happen then, but somehow, I think 
I got it, that to tie my very acute sense of beauty to the project of 
making myself look beautiful was definitely a mug’s game. Ap-
parently, the notion of a visual/tactile beauty that might be im-
personal, dislinked from the need to present a first-person self 
to the world, came as news to me — late, late news. But exciting! 
My fingers were very hungry to be handling a reality, a beauty, 
that wasn’t myself, wasn’t any self, and didn’t want to be.
*
There’s an enigmatic photograph that seems related to this. Tak-
en in 1926 on the China/Tibet border, by the Viennese-Ameri-
can botanist Joseph Rock, it shows, as the caption explains, “A 
[Buddhist] monk on the banks of the upper Yellow River [who] 
repeatedly raises and lowers a[n engraved] board on the surface 
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of the water, each time ‘printing’ the river with images of Bud-
dhist deities which are carried away downstream.”1
Of course, the varieties of Buddhist culture contain lots of 
analogues to this practice. Every time the wind blows, the air of 
Asia gets “imprinted” by the text of slips of paper tied to trees 
in Japan, or by chains of prayer flags in Nepal and Tibet. When 
small handheld prayer wheels get rotated by the flick of a lone 
pedestrian’s wrist, or huge ones by the muscular push of monks 
or pilgrims, the wheel of Dharma is itself turned.
The prayers on these prayer flags and wheels are pictures 
and sutras — representing dharma, truth, what is — rather than 
requests addressed to a powerful being; so what happens here, 
again, is a promulgation of something, something that simply 
exists, by no one, to no one. It’s in the unanswerable impersonal-
ity of practices like these, I think, that one feels the real force of 
Buddhist atheism. No one sends the message, concomitantly no 
one receives it, and yet it — what? — it messages, messages itself 
on the wind and water, always beside the splitting “point” of di-
rectional address, in a way that somehow helps; if only through 
its promiscuous, sublime refusal to generate the rhetorical dyad 
of subject and object, or agent and acted-upon.
*
In The Tibetan Book of Living and Dying, Sogyal Rinpoche offers 
an image that, when I first read it, filled me with a comical sense 
of recognition:
Imagine a person who suddenly wakes up in hospital after 
a road accident to find she is suffering from total amnesia. 
Outwardly, everything is intact: she has the same face and 
form, her senses and her mind are there, but she doesn’t have 
any idea or any trace of a memory of who she really is. In 
1 Michael Aris, Lamas, Princes, and Brigands: Joseph Rock’s Photographs of 
the Tibetan Borderlands of China (New York: China Institute in America, 
1992), 86.
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exactly the same way, we cannot remember our true iden-
tity, our original nature. Frantically, and in real dread, we cast 
around and improvise another identity, one we clutch onto 
with all the desperation of someone falling continuously into 
an abyss. This false and ignorantly assumed identity is “ego.”
So, ego, then, is the absence of true knowledge of who we 
really are, together with its result: a doomed clutching on, 
at all costs, to a cobbled together and makeshift image of 
ourselves, an inevitably chameleon charlatan self that keeps 
changing and has to, to keep alive the fiction of its existence. 
In Tibetan ego is called dak dzin, which means “grasping to a 
self.” … The fact that we need to grasp at all and go on and on 
grasping shows that in the depths of our being we know that 
the self does not inherently exist. From this secret, unnerving 
knowledge spring all our fundamental insecurities and fear.2
It’s not that I resonated so much with the notion of a true iden-
tity hovering somewhere behind the false ones, but it did seem 
so plausible that one would respond in exactly that way if one 
somehow did forget just who one was. All the dreams in which 
I’m sitting on somebody’s thesis defense but can’t remember 
ever seeing them before much less reading their dissertation; feel 
desperate to cover over this gap in my cognitive continuity; and 
in the event prove able to do just fine with it, generating ornery 
objections, judicious praise, and endlessly articulated opinions 
with the best of them. Whew! Leaving me to wonder, by the way, 
in these dreams, whether everybody on the committee might be 
as clueless as myself. The compulsive way we “argue” by show-
ing each other’s opinions to be mutually contradictory, as if we 
could best conceal the pathetic, makeshift patchiness of our own 
ego by exposing that of someone else.
Generating opinions, in fact, came to feel like a key to this 
desperate ego-retro-improvisation, and strikingly so in my aca-
demic world — opinions as a way of laboriously, noisily, endless-
2 Sogyal Rinpoche, The Tibetan Book of Living and Dying (New York: Harp-
erCollins, 2002), 120–21. 
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ly treading water rather than risk submersion in the salty depths 
of one’s amnesia. One of the reasons I found I loved making 
things, weavings and collages, rather than texts: things neither 
hold nor are opinions and, ideally, cannot be mistaken for them.
*
What’s with the amnesia thing, though? Why identify so strong-
ly with that? I have some ideas, though I’m not quite sure. For 
one thing, though I didn’t exactly find myself in a hospital with 
no memory of my name, I did suddenly find myself wearing an 
outer-space-looking neck brace, getting lots of attention from 
very grave-looking doctors, getting my body “imaged” with a 
minute intensiveness that descended to the level of cells and 
molecules, and being gently told to think in terms of maybe two 
or six more years of life instead of maybe thirty or fifty. I’d al-
ready learned from the original cancer diagnosis that a common 
response to catastrophic news, at any rate one that I seem prone 
to, is a quite violent pulverizing of the attention span. It’s prob-
ably a great defense mechanism, a kind of enforced “one day 
at a time.” Sufficient unto this particular second is the disaster 
thereof, so don’t make any connections with the last second or 
the next. It’s an effect that can take a long time to recede — that 
is, if it ever does. Not so surprising, then, that at that juncture 
I felt closer to the amnesia than to the project of patching to-
gether a coherent story to conceal it.
What may have been adding to that sense of amnesia is the 
accumulating cognitive effect of the various cancer therapies I 
underwent. Most of the (little) research on so-called “chemo-
brain” focuses on high-dose adjuvant chemotherapy, which I 
didn’t have, but it often seems to me that I do feel the accumulat-
ed cognitive effects of some combination of the original chemo 
I took and the subsequent years of radical hormone suppres-
sion. I wouldn’t say I feel stupider now than before — but I’m 
encountering a whole lot more verbal blockages, some of them 
quite dramatic, and as for numbers, the only appropriate phrase 
is “Forget it.” In fact, before I learned about the phenomenon of 
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chemobrain, I often wondered whether I might have suffered 
one or more small, unremarked strokes.
But then it also seems, and I don’t know what the ontologi-
cal status of this observation can be, but it also seems as though 
the whole baby boomer generation, or maybe just everybody in 
our culture, is suddenly losing our memory together, or at least 
becoming obsessed with the specter of such cognitive loss. Don’t 
you think so? It’s as though all the amnesiacs in that hospital 
ward were suddenly trembling on the verge of just not bothering 
to come up with cover stories at all.
Barbara Herrnstein Smith is fond of the notion of the “se-
nile sublime,” as she calls it, and I’ve always been attracted to it, 
too. She uses it to describe various more or less intelligible per-
formances by old brilliant people, whether artists, scientists, or 
intellectuals, where the bare, cold bones of a creative structure 
seem finally to emerge from what had been the obscuring pup-
pyfat of personableness, timeliness, or sometimes even of coher-
ent sense. Who wouldn’t find it magnetic, the idea of emerging 
into this senile sublime?
*
A lot of what I encountered as “Buddhism” at that time came 
from a then-recently published semi-bestseller by Sogyal 
Rinpoche, called The Tibetan Book of Living and Dying. Sogyal 
Rinpoche’s book is a highly popularized, at the same time im-
pressively inclusive introduction to Tibetan Buddhism, and it 
spoke to me at that moment because it’s so powerfully organized 
around exactly the issue of making real the encounter with 
death. What I found out from it is that the wisdom traditions of 
Tibetan culture have, if anything, a uniquely detailed focus on 
the experience of death as a privileged instance of the progress 
from reality to realization. A privileged instance but not the only 
one: after-death is one among a group of states, also including 
meditation, sleep, dreams, and dying itself, that are called bar-
dos, gaps or periods in which the possibility of realization is par-
ticularly available. Bar in Tibetan means “in between,” and do 
means “suspended or thrown.” As Robert Thurman writes, far 
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from isolating such moments the scheme of bardos “is used to 
create in the practitioner a sense that all moments of existence 
are ‘between’ moments, unstable, fluid, and transformable into 
liberated enlightenment experience.”3 Among these various “be-
tweens,” however, it is the one just following death, the bardo of 
Dharmata, that Thurman translates as the bardo of reality.
According to Sogyal Rinpoche, the bardos represent “mo-
ments when the mind is far freer than usual, moments … which 
carry a far stronger karmic charge and implication” (110). That 
implication, however, actually involves the possibility of step-
ping entirely aside from the forced overdetermination of karmic 
false identity — which is also to say, from the law of cause and 
effect — through a very simple achievement of recognition. “The 
reason why the moment of death is so potent with opportunity 
is because it is then that the fundamental nature of mind … will 
naturally manifest” (110). If at this crucial moment we can rec-
ognize the impersonal luminosity of mind, that is, recognize it 
not only as itself but as ourselves and not other than ourselves, 
then whatever becomes of our energies after death will be en-
tirely freed from the sordid or desperate perseverating traces of 
other, past misrecognitions. That is, the individuating, inexora-
ble, karmic laws of dualistic cause and effect will be transformed 
into, or simply recognized as, the overarching, radically under-
determining, transpersonal freedom called realization.
*
That gap between knowledge and realization, or between truth 
and reality: may I give a homely example of what I’m talking 
about? In the fall of 1998, when I was getting ready for my first 
trip to Asia, I was especially drawn to the sections in each guide-
book that make a stab at filling visitors in on local and regional 
norms of behavior: don’t blow your nose in public, don’t wear 
shoes indoors, bring your own tissue paper into the toilet, don’t 
3 Robert A.F. Thurman, The Tibetan Book of the Dead (New York: Bantam 
Books, 1994), 34.
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hold hands in public except with someone of your own sex, 
walk clockwise around temples and stupas. One instruction that 
turns up in one guidebook after another is that gifts are sup-
posed to be both proffered and received using both hands. This 
seemed important to remember, not only because it is true in 
all three of the countries I was visiting on that trip, but also be-
cause, as every source agreed, the giving and receiving of small 
gifts was going to be the warp and weft of any social interaction. 
So, I stocked up on theory paperbacks, tins of New York State 
maple syrup, and baby presents for my new nephew in Seoul, 
and reminded myself repeatedly that when I handed them over 
or received gifts in return, I should definitely remember to use 
both hands.
As it turned out, that trip was wonderful, and soon I was 
reading guidebooks for a second trip to two other Asian coun-
tries. And sure enough, it turned out that in Nepal and Thailand 
you’re also supposed to use both hands for giving and receiving 
presents. Not a surprise — I already knew this rule well. What 
did surprise me was to look back suddenly and realize, for the 
first time, that in all the giving and receiving of gifts during the 
previous trip, I had in fact not once made the necessary mental 
connection that would have prompted me to perform those acts 
using both hands. Not once; and yet in some other register I 
certainly did and still do know the rule perfectly well, and I had 
firmly in mind the intent of following it.
It was just that — 
It was just that what? I don’t know how to explain it. It’s just 
that I’m hardly ever all that self-possessed. But what does that 
mean? Or maybe it’s that handing some particular package to 
Songmin or Fifi or Jo, in some particular apartment, street, or 
classroom, isn’t easily recognized as “giving a gift” to “someone” 
in “Asia.”
Or maybe it is a memory problem. As I mentioned, I do tend 
to feel as if my mental filing was all done by some temp who 
made up a brilliant new system and then quit in a huff without 
explaining it to anyone else.
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I want to say that I knew this rule, but still hadn’t realized 
it — that it hadn’t succeeded in becoming real to me, real in the 
same register as Fifi or as my brother’s living room. There’s noth-
ing necessarily transcendental about this sense of “realization”; 
all it would have required was someone to perform the humble, 
maternal office of saying, “Remember? We talked about this at 
home. Now, when you hand over this present, what do you do?”
Anyway, that’s the only sense in which I can think of real-
ity nowadays: reality not as what’s true but as what’s realized, 
what is or has become real. Where is the gap between knowing 
something — even knowing it to be true — and realizing it, en-
countering it as real?
Reality in this sense, as it happens, may be entirely or-
thogonal to the question of truth. The order of truth, after all, 
is propositional. The order of reality, on the other hand, while 
it might include people uttering or thinking propositions, isn’t 
itself propositional. For example, there are many true proposi-
tions that would describe the room in which we’re meeting this 
afternoon. Not even an infinite number of such true proposi-
tions, however, would exhaust or saturate this space in the order 
of reality.
Other characteristics that distinguish the order of reality 
from that of truth: the order of reality is spatial as much as tem-
poral. (Maybe that’s what makes real estate, real estate.) Reality, 
unlike truth, tends toward analog as much as or more than digi-
tal representation. And correspondingly, unlike truth, reality 
tends toward the non-dual.
I wonder whether it’s because of this tropism toward non-
duality that the psychology of realization is so much a specialty 
of Buddhist thought? Whatever the reason, it does seem re-
markable both how much attention Buddhism pays to the gap 
between knowing and realizing, and retroactively, how little at-
tention is paid to it in Western thought. To practice Buddhism, 
after all, is to spend all the time you can in the attempt to realize 
a set of understandings most of whose propositional contents 
are familiar to you from the beginning of your practice. The 
very existence, the multiplicity, the intensiveness of different 
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Buddhist traditions testify to the centrality of the project of re-
alization; to the sense of how normal it is for realization to lag 
behind knowledge by months or eons; and to a concern that any 
pedagogy of realization is likely to be a hit-or-miss matter hap-
lessly dependent on the contingencies of the individual.
The guidance offered to the newly dead in the Bardo Thodol 
or so-called Tibetan Book of the Dead, meant to be read aloud to 
those undergoing the bardo of reality, has very much the home-
ly, practical structure of that maternal adjuration to “remember, 
this is what we talked about at home.” The main thing needed by 
the dead, in the Bardo of Reality, is orientation amid the light-
shows and ostentatious projections of an anxious, dissolving 
identity. In Thurman’s translation, for instance, on the fourth 
day in this Bardo, the person is reminded, 
On this fourth day, the red light that is the purity of the ele-
ment fire dawns. …Do not fear it! … you want to flee it … . 
But … you must fearlessly recognize that brilliant red, pierc-
ing, dazzling clear light as [your own] wisdom. Upon it place 
your mind, relaxing your awareness in the experience of 
nothing more to do. … If you can recognize it as the natural 
energy of your own awareness, without feeling faith, without 
making prayers, you will dissolve indivisibly with all the im-
ages and light rays and you will become a Buddha. If you do 
not recognize it as the natural energy of your own awareness, 
then pray and hold [onto] your aspirations for it, thinking, 
“It is the light ray of the compassion of the Lord Amitabha! I 
take refuge in it!” (138–39).
In the Bardo Thodol, each day’s coaching ends with an encourag-
ing note to the reader-aloud, such as, “When you thus repeated-
ly orient the deceased, however feeble his affinity, if he does not 
recognize one wisdom, he will recognize another. It is impos-
sible not to be liberated” (141). As the next day dawns, though, 
the text resumes wearily but patiently. “However, even though 
you orient the deceased repeatedly in this way, still through long 
association with the myriad instincts, and little previous experi-
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ence with the purified perception of wisdom, even though he is 
clearly oriented, he is pulled beyond these recognitions by [the 
deforming traces of cause-and-effect]” (141). So today’s appari-
tion is …
*
Hoping to enable an end-run around this laborious process, in 
his book, Sogyal Rinpoche details several versions of a visualiza-
tion practice called phowa which, if performed at the moment of 
death, is supposed to make enlightened recognition possible in 
the Bardo of becoming. “In fact,” he writes,
you should be so familiar with the practice … that it becomes 
a natural reflex, your second nature. If you have seen the film 
Gandhi, you will know that when he was shot, his immedi-
ate response was to call out: “Ram … Ram!” which is, in the 
Hindu tradition, the sacred name of God. Remember that we 
never know how we will die, or if we will be given the time 
to recall any kind of practice at all. What time will we have, 
for example, if we smash our car into a truck at 100 mph on 
the freeway? There won’t be a second then to think about 
how to do [the practice], or to check the instructions in this 
book. Either we are familiar with [it] or we are not. There is 
a simple way to gauge this: just look at your reactions when 
you are in a critical situation or in a moment of crisis, such 
as an earthquake, or a nightmare. Do you respond with the 
practice or don’t you? And if you do, how stable and confi-
dent is your practice? 
I remember a student of mine in America who went out 
riding one day. The horse threw her; her foot got stuck in the 
stirrup, and she was dragged along the ground. Her mind 
went blank. She tried desperately to recall some practice, 
but nothing at all would come. She grew terrified. What was 
good about that terror was that it made her realize that her 
practice had to become her second nature. This was the les-
son she had to learn; it is the lesson, in fact, we all have to 
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learn. Practice … as intensively as you can, until you can 
be sure you will react with it to any unforseen event. This 
will make certain that whenever death comes, you will be as 
ready as you can be. (221)
“The point’s not what becomes you, but what’s you.” I realize 
that in one sense, this kind of exhortation could come straight 
out of the most vindictive of the Puritan homiletics meant for 
terrorizing children. And at the moment of my sudden rediag-
nosis, I was certainly vulnerable to being terrorized in such a 
way. In fact, I was finding, to my astonishment, that not even 
a life history as a totally nonreligious Jew was protecting me 
from getting spooked by middle-of-the-night images of dying 
and landing in, of all places, hell. I mean, Jews don’t believe in 
hell, but then Jews don’t believe in a lot of things that turn out 
to be real, like Richard Nixon. But while neither atheism nor Ju-
daism seemed to offer protection from such punishing images, 
my relief came, instead, from two other aspects of the Buddhist 
thought to which I was getting exposed. First, there were some 
reflections on reincarnation, which I unfortunately haven’t time 
to discuss here; but second, there was the blessed and welcom-
ing, however cool and impersonal, or, rather, even because of 
those traits, Buddhist embrace of nondualism. For instance, in 
the Heart Sutra:
No ignorance and also no extinction of it,
and so forth until no old age and death
and also no extinction of them.
No suffering, no origination,
no stopping, no path, no cognition,
also no attainment with nothing to attain.
In Christianity, by contrast, the notion of getting saved depends 
on an act of specifically unearned divine grace, in the context 
of a radically dualistic hypostatization of agency between active 
and passive. Even under the most immediate stress of mortal-
ity, there was just no way I could make sense of or identify with 
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that absolute kind of psychological splitting: it wasn’t me. Far 
indeed from the nondualistic Buddhist realization of the nature 
of mind, where, in the words of Dudjom Rinpoche,
Samsara does not make it worse
Nirvana does not make it better …
It has never been liberated
It has never been deluded
It has never existed
It has never been nonexistent.
(Tibetan Book of Living and Dying 50)
*
Somewhere in the background of this talk is a project I’ve had in 
mind for a while now, a still unrealized project for a conference 
or an anthology whose title would be something like “Critical 
Theory, Buddhist Practice.” I thought of the project as a way of 
marking and trying to understand the successive discovery that 
one after another of the intellectuals my age or younger whom 
I’m really interested in these days turn out also, on acquain-
tance, to be at some stage, whether early or advanced, in an 
exploration of some form of Buddhist practice or thought. I’m 
not just talking about dying people or Californians here, either. 
These recognitions have been taking place in the Bible-thumpin’ 
south, the windy heartlands, the Manhattan cosmopole, and the 
Puritan fastness of New England, as well.
I’ve no doubt there’s a lot to be said and thought about such 
encounters, both as they reflect a zeitgeist or two (or twenty) 
and as they intertwine with the intellectual, emotional, and spir-
itual destinies of a lot of really interesting individuals. Among 
the stories that await more telling, some of the historical ones 
involve American orientalism of the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries, the afterglow of a 1960s counterculture and the deep 
political discouragement of its cooptation, the longer reverbera-
tions of a Beat fascination with Japanese Zen, the fatuities and 
promiscuities of New Age marketing, the diasporic imperative 
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impelled by the post-1959 shattering of traditional, feudal Tibet-
an culture, and the funny mix of humility with nativist triumph-
alism in the rapid emergence of something that nowadays gets 
called “American Buddhism,” though it has barely a nominal re-
lation to anything practiced in the Chinatowns and other Asian 
immigrant communities scattered broadcast over the map of 
the United States. In fact Rick Fields, the most loving and criti-
cal historian of this movement so far, pointedly denominates it 
“white Buddhism.”
Another set of stories might involve both the aptitudes and 
the impasses of the critical theory that has shaped these two 
generations of us academic critics. Aspects of Buddhist thought 
that initially seem counterintuitive to many people — its rigor-
ous nondualism, for an obvious example, or its sense that in-
dividual identity is a delusion as well as a snare — can seem 
already self-evident and invitingly haimish to anyone whose 
mother’s milk has been deconstruction or, say, systems theory. 
Furthermore, I think many intellectuals experience a tremen-
dous, grateful relief at encountering a deep, ramified, already 
long-existent history of treating these shared nondualistic un-
derstandings as more or other than a series of propositions to 
be demonstrated and textual readings to be performed. In some 
ways it’s probably misleading to think of Buddhism as a religion; 
yet, as with a religion, the distinctive bonds between Buddhism 
and the question of reality seem to cluster around the issue of 
practice rather than of epistemology.
The only widespread Western practices I can think of that are 
even analogous to this occur in evangelical Christianity — the 
sometimes protracted struggle to be or to understand oneself as 
saved — or in psychoanalysis. These Western instances are anal-
ogous in that both of them frame realization, unlike knowledge, 
in terms of practices, practices that take place over time. But in 
psychoanalysis there is still, very often, at least the pretext that 
progress within analysis equals the achievement of new levels of 
propositional knowledge, for instance about one’s personal his-
tory. And meanwhile, the popularity of psychoanalysis within 
critical theory as a system or a language always tends toward 
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short-circuiting its realization as practice. So, its insights get 
added in turn to the list of things to know rather than becoming 
manifest as a way of knowing, never mind of doing or of being. 
And yet for many intellectuals, the most efficacious surprise for 
us in our real encounters with psychotherapy is how little our 
quickness of apprehension may have to do with the far statelier 
pace of realization and change. A humbling thing to catch on to, 
but only so long as one maintains the intellectual’s hair-trigger, 
disavowing contempt for the process of realization in all its real, 
obscure temporality. Perhaps the most change can happen when 
that contempt changes to respect, a respect for the very ordi-
nariness of the opacities between knowing and realizing.
In fact I’ve been struck by the relative impoverishment of any 
western psychology of knowledge and realization, whether em-
piricist or postmodern, compared with its density and richness 
in Buddhist thought. If anything, within the framework of the 
Buddhist respect for realization as both process and practice, 
the stuttering, exclusive perseveration of epistemological propo-
sitions in contemporary critical theory reads as a stubborn hys-
terical defense. Whether it comes in the form of antiessentialist 
hypervigilance or, say, of the moralizing Marxist insistence that 
someone else is evading a true recognition of materiality, all 
this epistemological fixation, with all its paralyzing scruples or 
noisy, accusatory projections, can also seem like a hallucinatori-
ly elaborated, long-term refusal to enter into realization as into a 
complex practice. Rather it can’t stop claiming mastery of reality 
as the flat, propositional object of a single verb, shivering in its 
threadbare near-transparency: the almost fatally thin “to know.”
*
I suppose the contradiction that might be going on with my 
current practice is then, Why the object fixation onto fiber art 
as real? Forget underdetermination; what can the sublimity of 
forgetting have to do with the apparent hyper-retentiveness of 
these “shmatta studies”? What could represent “clinging” to 
identity more regressively than their collaged evocation of, for 
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instance, the tattered security blanket of babyhood, whose bind-
ing I fingered and fingered into filthy rags that I refused to sur-
render even to be washed?
In my shrink’s notes from when I started making these textile 
collages, he jotted the following from my maunderings on the 
subject:
SILK WORK — TURNING FABRIC INTO OTHER FABRIC / CHILD-
HOOD BLANKET WITH THE SATIN BINDING / SKIN HUNGER / 
… BRO’S PILLOW ‘PIFFO,’ HIS DROOLING, “MAKING FISHES” 
ON IT  / MAY SAY SOMETHING ABOUT HOW HUNGRY OUR 
SKIN WAS FOR TOUCH, BUT ALSO ABOUT OUR HAVING THE 
PERMISSION TO DEVELOP AUTONOMOUS RESOURCES  / …  / 
TREASURE SCRAPS OF SILK / SOMEHOW THE SILK AND SHIT 
GO TOGETHER — THE WASTE PRODUCTS, FANTASIES OF SELF 
SUFFICIENCY, NOT DEPENDENT, SPINNING STRAW INTO GOLD. 
(A Dialogue on Love 206)
What if, instead of getting scared off by the notion of regression, 
we could acknowledge that the work of the security blanket, the 
“transitional object” in Winnicott’s phrase, really is continuous 
with that of the fiber art? Why would it be a scandal if the tasks 
of dying and those of toddlerhood, such as individuation and 
even toilet training, were not so different? were, so to speak, 
molded of the same odorous, biomorphic clay?
Suppose that getting toilet trained is about learning, forc-
ibly, to change the process of one’s person into a residual prod-
uct — into something that instead exemplifies the impersonal in 
its lumpishly ultimate and taboo form. Isn’t this one of the tasks 
of dying as well? Suppose the many, stubborn, transformational 
negotiations with chosen cloth objects at that period are a me-
dium for experimenting with the dimensions and new possi-
bilities of this unwelcome imperative. Another such imperative 
is the letting go of the infantile cutaneous touch of the person 
you love, who also loves you. These are also among the tasks of 
dying.
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The Heart Sutra, from which I’ve already quoted, places at 
the very head of its undoings of dualism this famous one:
Form does not differ from emptiness,
emptiness does not differ from form.
That which is form is emptiness,
that which is emptiness form.
Teachings on this sutra emphasize that “emptiness” here, or in-
deed emptiness anywhere, should be thought of as like the emp-
ty space on the inside of a bell; emptiness not blank but vibrant 
and gravid with subtle energy, potential, and arising. But maybe 
we can also think of the experimentally fantasied “emptiness” 
of a child’s voided insides, as the child learns to link that to the 
power of material formation, of the formal and of what is not 
herself.
*
I’ve mentioned Rick Fields, the influential American historian 
and practitioner of Buddhism. Last June, Rick Fields died of 
cancer at the age of fifty-seven. In an obituary in Tricycle maga-
zine, the magazine’s editor Helen Tworkov, wrote,
I saw Rick at his house the Thursday before he died. His 
skin was sallow and buttery soft, his eyes luminescent. With 
scratchy, slurred words, he explained that he was feeling 
woozy. … Then came a moment when we were alone. In a 
clear voice suddenly delivered of static, he spoke of the inter-
view that we had done for Tricycle [two years before]. “Do 
you remember when you said to me,” recalled Rick, “you’re 
dying and I’m dying. And you have cancer and I don’t. Is 
there a difference?” Then he continued, trying once more in 
this lifetime, to help me get it right. “Well, one way of under-
standing that difference, is that I’m in the bardo of dying and 
you’re not.”
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A few months earlier Rick had written [on] “The Bardo of 
Dying’ in his journal. … The bardo of dying begins when you 
are diagnosed with an incurable illness [and ends only when 
you enter the bardo of after-death]. Rick had come across 
these same teachings many times, but he wrote that this time, 
they “clearly revealed where I am, where I live in the cycle of 
existence — the endless wheel of life and death. … To realize 
this replaces ignorance with knowledge, perhaps even wis-
dom, or its beginning at least. Ah, this is where I am.”4
It’s interesting that Fields hadn’t found much to read about this 
particular bardo. I suppose it’s only recently that the bardo of 
dying, as opposed to that of after-death, has become for many 
people a sufficiently extensive space to invite a lot of elabora-
tion. Or political éclat (think how much the impact of early AIDS 
activism came from the stunning novelty of seeing young adults 
with a fatal disease who were nonetheless physically strong 
enough, and for a long enough time, to undertake the project of 
their own, forceful representation). AIDS and cancer are among 
the grave diseases where, in the absence of cure, modern medi-
cine has offered ever-earlier diagnosis along with, at least for 
AIDS, delayed mortality. Whether it be through early diagnosis 
or more effective treatment, at any rate, the bardo of dying has 
expanded for many of us to a period that can encompass sev-
eral years or even, sometimes, many. Tworkov remarks that Rick 
Fields valued “the companionship of those who inhabit the same 
bardo,” a companionship that can even generate a new kind of 
public sphere, as in the case of AIDS and increasingly, I hope, of 
people with advanced cancer. These may be years of good health 
or ill health, of pain or its relative absence, of lassitude or energy. 
More likely all these are mixed together unpredictably, intermit-
tently, though on a worsening trajectory.
A few months ago, getting a checkup, I mentioned to my 
oncologist an academic conference on death and dying and re-
marked that, as far as I could tell from the program, I was the 
4 Helen Tworkov, “Obituary for Rick Fields,” Tricycle 9, no. 1 (Fall 1999): 23.
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only sick person involved in it. He said, “You know, it’s a nice 
philosophical question at this point, in exactly what sense you 
can be said to be sick.” He meant his comment to be cheering, 
and it actually was — I’m feeling very well, and I liked his ac-
knowledging that.
At the same time, what’s harder to explain is the sense of 
recognition that comes, as Fields put it, with being able to see 
and say, “Ah, this is where I am” — in this bardo, the one of dy-
ing. Fields also noted how others, such as the healthy, who “live 
in different bardos, move perhaps at different speeds, perceive, 
think, feel perhaps at different frequencies.” To say that there 
seem to be distinctive psychological and spiritual tasks to ac-
complish in the bardo of dying, for anyone lucky enough to be 
able to focus and be present to them, is only another way of say-
ing that there are special freedoms to be claimed here: freedoms 
both of meaning, relation, and memory, yet also from them.
*
When Sherwin Nuland, the physician author of How We Die, 
writes about the way metastatic cancer behaves in the human 
body, he does so in a chapter entitled, not “The Malignancy,” 
but rather “The Malevolence of Cancer” (my emphasis). It’s clear 
that he simply disapproves of such behavior, essentially on civic 
grounds. Cancer cells, he points out, reproduce promiscuously 
while they are still immature, becoming drains on society.
Cancer cells are fixed at an age where they are still too young 
to have learned the rules of the society in which they live. As 
with so many immature individuals of all living kinds, every-
thing they do is excessive and uncoordinated with the needs 
of constraints of their neighbors. … Malignant cells concen-
trate their energies on reproduction rather than in partaking 
in the missions a tissue must carry out in order for the life of 
the organism to go on. The bastard offspring of their hyper-
active (albeit asexual) fornicating are without the resources 
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to do anything but cause trouble and burden the hardwork-
ing community around them.5
The 1980s and ’90s image of the demonized welfare mother and 
her terrorizing brood, as sinister as Milton’s Sin and Death, is all 
but explicit; he even refers to the tumor cells’ rapacious behavior 
as “wilding” (208). And however immature, they deserve to be 
tried as adults. “A cluster of malignant cells is a disorganized au-
tonomous mob of maladjusted adolescents … . If we cannot help 
its members grow up, anything we can do to arrest them, re-
move them from our midst, or induce their demise — anything 
that accomplishes one of those aims — is praiseworthy” (210).
Setting aside the phobic and, still more, the firmly anthro-
pomorphic nature of this language, it’s true that the progress of 
this disease is extremely unpredictable and antinomian. Each 
type of metastatic cancer has particular sites that it’s most prone 
to seeking out and devouring, in no particular order — breast 
cancer, for instance, besides often going to bone, has a tropism 
toward liver, lungs, eyes, brains — but there is no organ, vital or 
vestigial, including the little toe and the heart, where it won’t 
take hold if the tide of contingency and sheer unorganization 
drops it there. The disease’s course depends much on the thin-
nest fabric of whimsy, and not at all on any law — except for the 
one law, of being fatal.
It’s thus that a certain Buddhist problematic becomes so 
heartfelt in the face of advanced cancer: the coming to terms, 
and ideally terms of love if not of dignity, with a process where 
endless underdetermination continues to arise and arise in the 
face of one single overdetermination, whose narrative coher-
ence will be only retrospective. “The point’s not what becomes 
you, but what’s you” — if one isn’t going to cling desperately to 
a self, however, another point might be to become it; to identify 
with the fabric and structure of this discohesive fate itself.
5 Sherwin B. Nuland, How We Die: Reflections on Life’s Final Chapter (New 
York: Vintage Books, 1995), 209.
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*
I’ll end with one more poem — this one’s about toilet training, 
but it also quotes from the Heart Sutra.
Bathroom Song
I was only one year old;
I could tinkle in the loo,
such was my precocity.
Letting go of Number Two
in my potty, not pyjama,
was a wee bit more forbidding
— and I feared the ravening flush.
So my clever folks appealed
to my generosity:
“What a masterpiece, Evita!
Look! We’ll send it off to Grandma!”
Under the river, under the woods,
off to Brooklyn and the breathing
cavern of Mnemosyne
from the fleshpotties of Dayton — 
what could be more kind or lucky?
From the issue of my bowels
straight to God’s ear — or to Frieda’s,
to the presence of my Grandma,
to the anxious chuckling
of her flushed and handsome face
that was so much like my daddy’s,
to her agitated jowls,
Off! Away! To Grandma’s place!
As, in Sanskrit, who should say
of the clinging scenes of karma,
“Gaté‚ gaté, paragaté”
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(gone, gone, forever gone),
“parasamgaté; bodhi; svaha!”
(utterly gone — enlightenment — 
svaha! Whatever svaha means),




Floating Columns / In the Bardo
“Floating Columns/ In the Bardo” was the title of the show of Eve’s 
fiber art at State University of New York Stony Brook’s Union Gal-
lery in fall 1999 (“Floating Columns” titled an exhibition at Rhode 
Island School of Design that fall and at the Cedar Creek Gallery 
in Durham, North Carolina, in spring 2000). For the City Uni-
versity of New York exhibition (in a lounge also used for lectures) 
the show’s title was truncated to “In the Bardo.” Eve composed a 
statement about the original show and revised it slightly for the 
second occasion. Melissa Solomon provided me with a copy of the 
original; Hal Sedgwick, responsible for the photos I reproduce, in-
cluded one that showed the revised statement. It is my copy text. 
I have left in brackets part of the original title and some wording 
at the end of Eve’s statement in which she furthers a comparison 
between her earlier and later work. Jason Edwards offers some 
hypotheses about the exhibition in “For Beauty Is a Series of Hy-
potheses? Sedgwick as Fiber Artist,” a discussion expanded in a 
forthcoming monograph that he gave me the chance to read. In it 
he also details the “Floating Columns” show of ten pieces of fabric 
art displayed on the gallery walls.
A writer and literary critic, I’m largely self-taught as a fiber artist. 
Despite a lifelong textile obsession, I began this work in earnest 
only three years ago, around the time I learned that a previously 
treated breast cancer had become incurable, and also around 
the time when I became very interested in Buddhist thought.
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Tibetan Buddhism has had a strong influence on recent us 
thought about death and dying largely through such books as 
Sogyal Rinpoche’s popular Tibetan Book of Living and Dying 
based on the so-called Tibetan Book of the Dead, an oral read-
ing that offers the recently departed soul a guide through the 
“bardo” or between-state that immediately follows death. (Ti-
betan bar = in between, do = suspended, thrown.) In this bardo, 
the soul encounters a succession of distracting, often terrifying 
lights, winds, sounds, and peaceful or even wrathful apparitions 
of deities. The task and great opportunity of the soul — its way 
to enlightenment and away from constant rebirth into pain and 
delusion — is just to recognize these alien manifestations as not 
other than itself, not other than its own, radiantly sustained 
awareness. Such a recognition is an entirely simple but appar-
ently, usually impossible one.
As Sogyal Rinpoche points out, “The word ‘bardo’ is com-
monly used to denote the intermediate state between death 
and rebirth, but in reality bardos are occurring continuously 
throughout both life and death,” and because of their thresh-
old nature “are junctures when the possibility of liberation, or 
enlightenment, is heightened.” Among the bardos specifically 
identified in Tibetan Buddhism are those of rebirth, living, fall-
ing asleep, dreaming, and “the painful bardo of dying,” which 
occupies the space between contracting a terminal illness and 
death itself. With certain illnesses (cancer and HIV, for instance) 
and in the present state of medicine, that transitive suspension 
or gap, the bardo of dying, may be quite an extended one. Like 
other bardos, it is electric with spiritual possibility as well as 
with pain and loss.
The present installation offers a certain experience of the 
bardo of dying. The large (my size), light figures, analogous to 
the peaceful and wrathful deities of that other bardo, are bearers 
of some crucial aspects of this experience, holding them open 
to such psychic operations as identification, disavowal, projec-
tion, recognition, rage, or reparation. The figures’ strongest rep-
resentational ties are to the disorienting and radically denuding 
bodily sense generated by medical imaging processes and illness 
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itself, on the one hand, and, on the other, to material urges to 
dress, to ornament, to mend, to re-cover and heal. Correspond-
ingly, a central element of each figure is the vertebral column, 
which I daily experience as both physically disintegrating, yet 
still offering a pathway for vital energy and buoyancy. These 
are not opposites: in different ways, both cancer and Buddhism 
highlight the need of coming to loving terms with what’s tran-
sitory, mutable, even quite exposed and ruined, while growing 
better attuned to continuities of energy, idiom, and soul. 
The sustained encounter with mortality is tied not only to 
a sense of sublimity and abstraction but also to a great appre-
ciation for the quotidian sensuousness of fiber materials and 
processes. As a writer exploring the fields of gay/lesbian stud-
ies and queer theory, I’ve long gravitated toward nondualistic 
approaches to ideas and genres [– working, for example, at the 
boundaries between poetry and prose, between activism and 
scholarship]. The pieces in this show also mean to span such 
productive, highly charged, and permeable boundaries as those 
between craft and art; between woven fiber (cloth) and nonwo-
ven (paper, felt, soie mariée); between feeling and meditation, 
or gravity and lightness; at last, between making and unmaking.
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